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Corporations are significant contributors to charitable causes.'
Corporate philanthropy has become an element of corporate citizenship;
the idea that corporations play a role in the community not solely defined
by being a part of a community's economy.2 Corporations are also
significant contributors to political campaigns.' This article explores the
relationship between corporations' philanthropic and political roles,
suggesting that there is significant overlap in what appear to be discrete
activities. The overlap arises from the use of certain exempt
organizations 4 as conduits between corporate contributors and candidates
1. "Corporations" refers to business corporations that are taxable entities and which
exist in the first instance to provide a return on the capital advanced by its shareholders.
Many, probably most, exempt organizations are also organized in corporate form, either
under special state laws for non-profit corporations or under state general corporation
laws. Exempt organizations, whether organized as corporations, trusts, or unincorporated
associations, are defined by federal and state tax laws.
2. The use of corporate assets for charitable contributions remains controversial and
raises fundamental questions about the nature of a corporation. See, e.g., Rikki Abzug
& Natalie J. Webb, Rationale and Extra-Rationale Motivations for Corporate Giving:
Complementing Economic Theory With Organizational Science, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
1035 (1997); Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Philanthropy, Executives' Pet Charities and
the Agency Problem, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1147 (1997); Faith Stevelman Kahn,
Pandora's Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44
UCLA L. REv. 579 (1997); Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of Corporate Giving: Tax
Expenditures, the Nature of the Corporation, and the Social Construction of Charity, 44
DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1994); Michelle Sinclair & Joseph Galaskiewicz, Behavioral
Approaches to Studying Corporate Charitable Contributions, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
1059 (1997); Linda Sugin, Theories of the Corporation and the Tax Treatment of
Corporate Philanthropy, 41 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 835 (1997).
3. A corporate contribution is one made using funds of the corporate treasury,
Contributions of corporate treasury funds are distinguishable from contributions made
through corporate political action committees ("PACs"), which do not draw on corporate
treasury funds but are instead funded by employees and shareholders directly. See infra
Part II.B.4 (discussing corporate PACs).
4. See I.R.C. § 501(c) (1986). Section 501(c)(3) organizations may neither support
nor oppose candidates for public office. However, labor organizations described in §
501(c)(5), business leagues described in § 501(c)(6), agricultural organizations described
in § 501(c)(5), and civic associations described in § 501(c)(4) may support or oppose
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for public office.5 Such conduit relationships raise significant issues under
both election law and tax law as well as broader issues of public discourse
consistent with democratic values.6
The article begins by analyzing the mosaic of prohibitions and
limitations placed on corporation political contributions in both election
law and tax law. This is the legal predicate for corporate-candidate
conduits. The article then examines the concept of a conduit and explores
the particular benefits available to both corporate contributors and
candidates from using tax-exempt organizations as conduits. This
examination defines the intersection between corporate philanthropy and
corporate political activity. Next, the article considers broader issues of
the relationship of conduits to democratic discourse and social justice.
Finally, the article examines approaches to Campaign finance reform as
they bear on questions of exempt organizations as corporate-candidate
conduits. The article suggests that disclosure remedies will be either
ineffective because of the use of corporate-candidate conduits or so costly
and invasive that other avenues of political campaign finance reform merit
further consideration.
I. CORPORATE POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS:
PURPOSES AND CONTROVERSIES
A. Understanding Political Campaigns
When one thinks of a campaign for public office, one tends to think
in terms of an individual candidate seeking to persuade voters to support
him or her with votes or contributions or both. This is a deceptively
simplistic model that wrongly specifies the players and the nature of their
interaction. The model is misleading because it is based on the
unarticulated assumption that campaigns are interactions between individual
candidates and individual voters. Today, however, a candidate may spend
less time discussing ideas with individuals in their capacities as voters than
she spends persuading corporations, unions, trade associations, and interest
candidates for public office directly or through affiliated PACs, provided that their
primary purpose is an appropriate exempt purpose and provided that the political activity
does not exceed certain thresholds. For an analysis of tax-exempt organizations, see
FRANcEs R. HILL & BARBARA L. KIRSCHTEN, FEDERAL AND STATE TAXATION OF ExEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
5. Conduit relationships also exist between individual contributors and candidates,
as the Gingrich matter indicated. See infra Part IV.B.3. Much of the analysis presented
here applies to individual contributors as well.
6. See infra Part V.A.
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groups to fund the campaign.7 In a large and complex country with large
voting districts, retail campaigning for all but local offices in small
jurisdictions has become virtually a thing of the past and a physical
impossibility. We now communicate through television, a rather expensive
medium.8 Candidates seek financial support from as many sources as
possible, and have become extraordinarily entrepreneurial in facilitating
contributions that appear to be barred by federal election law or tax law
or both.9 This is the case with corporate political contributions.
The model is also deceptively simplistic in its unarticulated
assumptions about the organizational structure of campaigns. A campaign
is a conglomerate, a complex structure of organizations designed primarily
to raise money. Neither election law nor tax law limits the number of
organizations a campaign may involve. While a candidate may have only
one principal campaign committee," the campaign may involve several
7. Candidates commonly complain that they are forced by the costs of political
campaigns to spend too much of their time raising money and one rarely hears of a
politician who enjoys fund-raising. There are few recent studies of how candidates
actually use their time. For one such study of selected Senate campaigns, some going
back to the 1970s, see RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., SENATORS ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL: THE
POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION (1996). Fenno devotes only passing attention to fund-raising,
which highlights the disjunction between the public face of the candidate at campaign
events and the more private fact of the campaign finance operation. The connection
between these two faces of a campaign and the candidate's subsequent performance in
public office remains to be explored and analyzed. Most contemporary information
comes from journalists who have become sophisticated observers of the political money
trails of campaigns.
8. See, e.g., Max Frankel, It's the Demand, Stupid, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1997, §
6 (Magazine), at 24 (arguing that reform attempts which limit the supply of political
money to candidates for advertising are doomed without efforts to limit the demand for
it).
9. See Peter Applebome, In Gingrich's College Course, Citics Find a Wealth of
Ethical Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1995, at A12 (Speaker Newt Gingrich is quoted
as saying of the funding of his controversial lectures through tax-exempt organizations,
"It's aggressive, it's entrepreneurial, it's risk-taking."); see also REPORT OF THE SELECT
COMMiMtEE ON Enucs, IN THE MATTER OF R AESEAnVE NEwr GINGRICH, ExHmrr 144, H.R.
REP. No. 105-1, 105th Cong., at 1212 (1997).
10. See 2 U.S.C. § 432(e)(1) (1994). Under I.R.C. § 527(h)(2)(A) (1986) and
Treas. Reg. § 1.527-2(e) (1996), a principal campaign committee enjoys certain tax
benefits; see also Milton Cerny & Frances R. Hill, Political Organizations, 13 EXEMPT
ORG. TAX REV., 591, 605-06 (1996); Milton Cerny & Frances R. Hill, The Tax Treatment
of Political Organizations, 71 TAX NOTES 651 (1996).
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other authorized committees" and other organizations, generally
those exempt from tax. The candidate is like a chief executive officer of
a complex structure and not simply a citizen presenting himself to his
fellow citizens as voters. This structural complexity results largely from
fund-raising concerns.' 2
Much of this article is devoted to showing how corporations can make
political contributions. However, the inquiry necessarily begins with the
questions of why corporations make political contributions and why these
contributions are controversial.
B. Why Corporations Contribute
Why does a corporate person that does not have the right to vote seek
to influence the voting behavior of individual persons who have the right
to vote? While much of the recent discussion focuses on the rights of
corporations to make political contributions, 3 there has been less attention
to why corporations choose to do so and what these reasons suggest about
campaign finance law.
There are two broad sets of reasons that corporations make political
contributions. The first relates to corporate business purposes and the
second relates to corporate executive preferences. 4 First, corporations
11. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 432(e)(3)(A) (1986) (stating that authorized committees
under § 432(e)(1) may support only one candidate); id. §§ 433-34 (setting forth the
registration and reporting requirements applicable to authorized committees, like those
applicable to principal campaign committees); id. § 441 (a)(4) (allowing "transfers between
and among political committees . . . of the same political party"); see also DAVID B.
MAGLEBY & CANDICE J. NELSON, THE MONEY CHASE: CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM 95-97 (1990).
12. Such structural complexity makes enforcement of current election law limitations
more difficult and renders proposals to reform campaign finance through greater effective
disclosure more problematic. For a discussion of conduits and approaches to campaign
finance reform, see infra Part VI.
13. See, e.g, Randall P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 IOWA L. REv. 735
(1995); Victor Brudney, Association, Advocacy, and the First Amendment, 4 WM. &
MARY BILL RTs. J. 1 (1995); Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations
and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577 (1990); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Engaged and
the Inert: Theorizing Political Personality Under the First Amendment, 81 VA. L. REV.
1 (1995); Andrew Stark, Strange Bedfellows: Two Paradoxes in Constitutional Discourse
Over Corporate and Individual Political Activity, 14 CARDOzO L. REv. 1343 (1993);
Charles D. Watts, Jr., Corporate Legal Theory Under the First Amendment: Bellotti and
Austin, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 317 (1991).
14. These two purposes parallel the reasons generally given for corporate
philanthropy. See supra note 2. Both corporate philanthropy and corporate political
contributions are part of the continuing controversy over the nature of a corporation and
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seek to influence the composition and behavior of government because
government actions directly affect corporate business success."
Influencing the composition of government is one means of influencing
the behavior of government. This proposition might seem self-evident.
However, the assertion of a direct connection between the composition of
government and the policy outcomes of government rests on problematic
assumptions about the influence of one or even several officials on policy
outcomes. Even the President cannot assure contributors of a particular
outcome, although a presidential candidate, like a candidate for any other
office, can promise to attempt to deliver an outcome. In American
politics, buying a legislative majority for one issue would be prohibitively
expensive since the majority would have to be purchased one member at
a time. American political parties are more like coalitions of elected
officials than like programmatically coherent organizations with shared
policy positions and the ability to enforce conformity to them. This
porous quality of the two major American parties and the fluid nature of
the policy process mean that supporting particular candidates does not
guarantee particular outcomes.
In this environment, neither candidates nor parties seem, in many
cases, to offer particular outcomes but rather access to the policy
process.' 6 Such access may be the most valuable benefit in a fluid policy
process. Politicians threaten a loss of access, not an adverse vote on
the extent to which an entity can have purposes independent of those of its managers. See
A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1049 (1931);
A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1365 (1932).
15. The denial of a deduction under I.R.C. § 162 for a campaign contribution by a
corporation does not support the argument that such contributions are not in substance
ordinary and necessary business expenses. It suggests instead that such expenditures must
be treated in the same way for tax purposes as individual political contributions, and that
neither can be deducted.
16. Classic quid pro quo arrangements are by no means obsolete. Controversies
over campaign finance in the 1996 election center on allegations of promises for cash.
These allegations center on the Clinton campaign at least in part because, as the winner,
he is in a position to keep any promises he might have made while Bob Dole, whatever
he might have promised, is unable to deliver. One of the now-famous Clinton coffees
with political contributors has raised significant questions about a quid pro quo because
the Comptroller of the Currency, Eugene A. Ludwig, who is responsible for bank
regulation, met with several leading bankers. See, e.g., Clay Chandler & Michelle
Singletary, Comptroller of the Controversy: Bank Regulator Eugene Ludwig Faces
Skepticism About His Role at Clinton Fund-Raiser, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1997, at Dl;
Alison Mitchell, President Regrets Top U.S. Regulator Met With Bankers, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 29, 1997, at Al; David E. Sanger & Stephen Labaton, Billions in Profits Were Issue
as Clinton and Bankers Met, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 31, 1997, at Al.
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particular legislation. A primary example is the threat of the House
Republican leadership to the Business Roundtable that they would lose
access if they did not stop contributing to Democrats and direct their
contributions exclusively to Republicans.1
7
There is evidence that money flows to power and that power demands
money. After the Republican party gained a majority in Congress in the
1994 election, the new Congressional leadership told important
constituencies that they would be expected to make contributions to the
new majority.' 8 This may be a more troubling pattern than having
contributors gamble on picking winners and then confronting the need to
deal in the policy arena with those they had not supported politically.
Now, it appears, all politicians are offering themselves to the same
contributors and all contributors are facing demands for money from the
same politicians. The systemic consequences of this pattern of money in
the policy process is a fertile topic for future study.
Evidence that corporate contributors routinely contribute to both
parties, and often to both candidates in a particular race, suggests that
contemporary government requires corporations to pay an access charge
in the form of a campaign contribution. The broad question of a market
in political access requires sustained inquiry beyond the scope of this
article. It is far from clear why any person, natural or corporate, should
have to pay a toll charge in the form of a campaign contribution to gain
sufficient access to public officials. It is also unclear why public officials
should be in a position to direct public resources to private interests in
exchange for campaign contributions. Any debate over the right of
corporations to make campaign contributions should proceed in the context
of why corporations feel the need to make such contributions.
The second reason advanced to explain corporate political
contributions is that corporate managers are using corporate assets to
support their own political preferences and to advance their own public
careers, perhaps in a quest for appointive public office or to raise their
17. See Helene Cooper, GOP to Rebuke CompaniesforBipartisan Donations, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 9, 1997, at A14 (detailing efforts of Republican leaders of the House of
Representatives to convince corporate leaders to contribute solely to Republican
candidates). "Companies that want to have it both ways, vows one top GOP strategist,
no longer will be involved in Republican decision-making 'or invited to our cocktail
parties.'" Id. One corporate leader responded that, "'America . . . is a bipartisan
country. It doesn't want to be a single-party country.'" Id.
18. See David Maraniss & Michael Weisskopf, Speaker and His Directors Make the
Cash Flow Right, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 1995, at Al.
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profile within the business community.' 9 This raises the fundamental
question of the nature of the corporation and how theories of the
corporation affect views about the rights of corporate entities to make
political contributions.2' Are corporations aggregates of diverse interests
or are they entities? What role should managers play in making various
types of decisions?
C. Rationales for Limiting Corporate Political Contributions
The prohibition on corporate political contributions rests on three
distinct rationales. The first is concern about impropriety or the
appearance of impropriety in shaping electoral and policy outcomes. The
second is a concern about the effect of concentrated wealth on elections.
The third is the problem of compelled contributions arising when the
19. The same two reasons are often advanced for corporation philanthropy, These
explanations can be complementary but are not necessarily so. The question with respect
to both corporate philanthropy and corporate political contributions is whether there has
been a wastage of corporate assets. Assertions of the tailoring of corporate philanthropy
or corporate political contributions to the preferences of corporate executives are by no
means indisputable evidence that corporate assets have been wasted. In the corporate
philanthropy area, a significant dispute arose when Mary Cunningham Agee, the wife of
William Agee, who was then the chief executive officer of Morrison Knudsen, operated
the corporation's philanthropic activities in a manner consistent with her preferences and
those of certain members of the board of directors, but not necessarily in a manner that
promoted the image of the corporation. The foundation had originally been established
to assist the corporation's employees, but Mary Agee directed virtually all of its
contributions to social service organizations affiliated with the Catholic Church. The
debate intensified when the company sought protection from its creditors under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The question was not whether the charity's operations were
inappropriate, but of what relation they bore to the corporation's legitimate business
interests and the foundation's own history. See Julie Bailey, MK Charity Funded Mary
Agee's Pet Projects, IDAHO STATESMAN, Feb. 8, 1995, at IA; Jim Hopkins, Knights of
the Board Table, IDAHO STATESMAN, June 9, 1995, at 7A; Jim Hopkins, Mary Agee's
Charity Raised Eyebrows, IDAHO STATESMAN, Feb. 27, 1995, at IA; MK Charity
Mission Off Track, IDAHO STATESMAN, Feb. 9, 1995, at 12A. William J. Agee defended
his wife in an opinion piece entitled Idaho Statesman Didn't Tell Real Story of Mary
Cunningham Agee, IDAHO STATESMAN, Feb. 14, 1995, at 8A. After William Agee was
removed from the corporation and Mary Agee no longer managed the foundation, the
paper began to report positively on the new foundation. See Julie Bailey, MKFoundation
Resumes Its Mission, IDAHO STATESMAN, Dec. 8, 1995, at IA; MK Charity Back on
Track, IDAHO STATESMAN, Dec. 9, 1995, at 8A; The story was also reported in the
national press. See Diana B. Henriques, A Celebrity Boss Faces Exile from 2d Corporate
Kingdom, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1995, at Al; Diana B. Henriques, Ties that Bind: His
Directors, Her Charity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1995, at DI.
20. See generally supra note 2.
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contributor corporation's shareholders do not all agree on the candidate or
cause that the corporation supports.
The first concern, corruption or the appearance of corruption, has
been defined narrowly by Buckley v. Valeo. ' In explaining its approval
of limitations on political contributions, the Court noted, "[t]o the extent
that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from
current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of
representative democracy is undermined. "' The Court found the problems
arising from the appearance of impropriety almost as troubling as instances
of actual exchanges of contributions for favors.23 This is a quasi-criminal
concept reflecting the post-Watergate mentality of a search for a 'smoking
gun' to establish culpability. While Watergate is synonymous with
campaign finance abuses, it was more importantly an impeachment inquiry
in which the search for a specific act was arguably appropriate. The result
is a narrow focus on specific acts and not on the systemic consequences
of political money.
The second rationale, the effect of concentrated wealth on elections,
focuses more broadly on the contest between the power of money and the
power of the vote. 24 In this perspective, both contribution and expenditure
limitations help ensure that money, especially concentrated wealth, does
not undermine the effect of numbers of votes.' This perspective was
21. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
22. Id. at 26-27. "Although the scope of such pernicious practices can never be
reliably ascertained, the deeply disturbing examples surfacing after the 1972 election
demonstrate that the problem is not an illusory one." Id. at 27.
23. See id. at 27 ("Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo
arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public
awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial
contributions."). In its analysis of the appearance of corruption, the Court came close
to an analysis of honest elections in creating and maintaining the legitimacy of the
American political system. To have done so, however, would have undermined the
Court's distinction between contributions and expenditures and broadened its concept of
corruption beyond specific exchanges of contributions for favors and into questions of
voting and concentrated wealth; analytical approaches that the Court specifically rejected.
See id.
24. This was a theme in the Watergate scandal, which involved corporate
contributions. See HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1976 ELECrION (1979); HERBERT
E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1972 ELECTION (1976).
25. This concern was the foundation of the Court of Appeals' decision that both the
contribution and expenditure limitations of the Federal Election Campaign Act were
consistent with First Amendment protections of political speech. See Buckley v. Valeo,
519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975). For a broader discussion of concentrated wealth and the
First Amendment protection of political speech by a member of the circuit court panel
deciding Buckley, see J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First
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rejected in substantial part by Buckley, which held that "the concept that
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in
order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment." 26  The effect was to limit scrutiny of political money to
narrow and separable instances of misbehavior and to reject the idea that
political money should be analyzed in systemic terms. The Court's
decisions in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce1 and Federal
Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.28 turned in
part on the relative economic power of the two organizations and their
members. But, in both cases, the Court also invoked the relative
opportunity for corruption and the captive member problem as well,
thereby blunting the force of its discussion of concentrated wealth.29
The third rationale, compelled contributions, grows out of analyses of
the corporate form. This is the argument that the use of corporate treasury
funds does not reflect a choice by shareholders or employees to take a
political position by supporting or opposing one or more candidates.3"
This line of reasoning grows out of the Court's Buckley assertion that the
amount of money contributed is a reasonably reliable indicator of public
Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 609 (1982).
26. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 4849. "The First Amendment's protection against
governmental abridgement of free expression cannot properly be made to depend on a
person's financial ability to engage in public discussion." Id. It is not accidental that the
Court's rejection of the concentrated wealth rationale appeared in the context of its
rejection of limitations on expenditures.
27. 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (holding that a trade association may not use treasury funds
to make an independent expenditure expressly advocating the election of a particular
candidate).
28. 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (holding that a single-issue organization created for the
express purpose of taking a stand in opposition to abortion may make an independent
expenditure expressly advocating the election of a particular candidate).
29. In Massachusetts Citizens for Life, the Court indirectly distinguished this
organization from the Michigan Chamber of Commerce discussed in A ustin. The three
features accounting for this holding are: 1) the organization was "formed for the express
purpose of promoting political ideas" and not for engaging in business activities; 2) the
organization has no shareholders or others with a claim to its assets or earnings and thus
"persons connected with the organization will have no economic disincentive for
disassociating with it if they disagree with its political activity"; and 3) the organization
does not accept contributions from corporations or labor unions and "[t]his prevents such
corporations from serving as conduits for the type of direct spending that creates a threat
to the political marketplace." 479 U.S. at 263-64.
30. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 662-63; Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at
260-61.
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support.3' While not explicitly stated, the Court implies that contributions
of corporate treasury funds are not considered political speech because
they do not necessarily reflect the choice of the shareholders or voters.
This is based on a theory of whether membership in an organization or
holding shares in a corporation could serve as a reasonable proxy for a
direct political preference. The Court held that it could in the case of
ideological organizations, 32 but it could not when those who withdrew
could do so only at the cost of foregoing other, non-political benefits that
explained their affiliation, such as earning dividends or participating in
33non-political programs.
The first of the three rationales has become paramount in the Court's
recent reasoning. The effect on corporate political contributions is to
provide a rationale for a narrow interpretation of the prohibition on
corporate political contributions. Even more importantly, it provides a
rationale for permitting corporate political contributions that are not made
directly to a candidate, earmarked for a particular candidate or coordinated
with a particular candidate. The result is a constitutional jurisprudence
that grows not out of a systemic concern with government legitimacy and
individual rights, but instead reflects a quasi-criminalized concept of the
First Amendment. 34 The analysis centers not on constitutional matters, but
on a search for indictable offenses, and not on the requisites for
representative democracy, but on crimes by politicians.
II. CORPORATE ROLES IN FINANCING POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS:
STATUTORY LIMITS AND OPPORTUNITIES
Understanding why exempt organizations become conduits for
corporate contributions to political candidates requires an understanding of
the transaction represented by a political contribution and of the legal
categories created to apply to this transaction. As this article suggests,
judicial modifications of the original statutory scheme for post-Watergate
31. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 56. Although Buckley did not involve corporations
or other organizations, the Court did not expressly exclude them from the analysis.
32. See Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 489 U.S. at 258.
33. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 662-63; see also Communications Workers of America
v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (applying this reasoning to the use of treasury funds by labor
unions). The issue of captive union members became politically controversial in light of
organized labor's major effort in support of Democratic candidates in the 1996 election.
See, e.g., Exempt from Reform, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1997, at A18.
34. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 40-43 (expressing concern with vagueness when
a First Amendment issue could result in criminal penalties). The Court should also have
been concerned about the detrimental effect of introducing concepts derived from criminal
law into First Amendment jurisprudence.
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campaign finance reform has resulted in a disjunction between political
contribution transactions and the statutory categories applied to them.
A. The Language of Current Campaign Finance Law
The language of campaign finance has become a specialized language
not directly accessible to ordinary English-speaking voters. Statutory
categories are expressed in terms bearing little relation to the transactions
to which they apply. Locating conduit transactions in both law and
practice requires a grounding in this foundational disjunction.
Understanding the language of campaign finance law begins with
understanding political contributions as transactions. Much more is
involved than a transfer of money or other value. The candidate's purpose
in soliciting contributions is to provide the material base for her quest for
public office, to enhance her electoral prospects by having enough money
to persuade enough voters to support her in order to ensure electoral
victory.35
Contributors' motives are more complex. Some contributors may
want to enhance the democratic process represented by elections and to
increase the likelihood of good government after the election. This kind
of other-directed motive may be part of the motivational mix of most
contributors. However, specific incentives may well be more
important-the desire to ensure a particular policy outcome or the desire
to secure a more general access to officeholders who occupy, or are
expected to occupy, critical points in the policy process.
To the participants in the political contribution transaction, everything
other than the basic transfer of value is a matter of tactics. Contributors
will make either direct or indirect transfers. It does not matter to
contributors whether or not the candidate controls the money transferred
as long as the politician acknowledges a political debt to the contributor
for the transfer. To a candidate, a transfer that he controls or one that is
made for his benefit still becomes the basis of a political obligation to the
contributor. A candidate does not make finely-drawn distinctions between
persuading voters to support him by using money he controls and having
others persuade voters to support him using money the candidate does not
directly control.
35. Voters are not participants in political contribution transactions. The debts that
politicians incur to those who vote for them are, it may be hypothesized, more diffuse and
less compelling than the debts they incur to their contributors. This dynamic of
asymmetrical obligations to contributors and voters is the basis for concern about the role
of elections in representative government and the nature of the policy process that results
from elections based on such asymmetrical obligations.
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Indirect contributions trigger the same political obligations as direct
contributions. Conduits facilitate indirect political contributions,.whether
they are made to the candidate subject to the candidate's control or
whether they are made for the benefit of the candidate. Therefore,
conduits are located in and, as discussed below, transform, the statutory
categories of current election law.
The incoherence of statutory categories derives from the Supreme
Court's holding in Buckley v. Valeo that contributions could be limited as
to both source and amount but that similar limitations on expenditures are
inconsistent with rights of political speech under the First Amendment. 6
The Court treated both contributions and expenditures as speech and
rejected the lower court's treatment of both as conduct.37 The Court found
that the "Act's contribution and expenditure limitations impose direct
quantity restrictions on political communication and association by
persons, groups, candidates, and political parties . . 38 The Court
rejected the argument that the time, place and manner restrictions it had
previously found acceptable under the First Amendment also limit the
quantity of communication and association, 39 asserting, for example, that
limits on the decibel level of a campaign sound truck did not limit the
quantity of speech.'4
The Court nevertheless found contribution limitations constitutional
while rejecting expenditure limitations. The Court held that contribution
limitations "entail[] only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's
36. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58-59. Although the Act's contribution and
expenditure limitations both implicate fundamental First Amendment interests, its
expenditure ceilings impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms
of political expression and association than do its limitations on financial contributions.
The only remaining expenditure limitations are applied in the case of presidential and
vice-presidential candidates who accept public funding. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(b) (1986),
construed in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 85-109. Certain expenditures by political parties are
also limited. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d).
37. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16.
Some forms of communication made possible by the giving and spending of
money involve speech alone, some involve conduct primarily, and some
involve a combination of the two. Yet this Court has never suggested that the
dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to
introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by
the First Amendment.
Id.
38. Id. at 18.
39. See id. at 17-19 (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975);
Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Kovacs
v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949)).
40. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 18 n.17.
NEW YORK LA W SCHOOL LA W REVIEW
ability to engage in free communication."" The Court found that rights
of association, not speech, were invoked in the contribution limits. 42 The
Court identified this association right as the right to make large
contributions and found the government's interest in preventing corruption
or the appearance of corruption a sufficiently important government
interest to justify restriction.
In contrast, the Court held that expenditure limitations directly
restricted the "quantity and diversity" of speech.' In effect, the Court
took the position that speech rights were more fundamental than
associational rights and that the speech rights of candidates and those
organized interests likely to make expenditures were more important in the
constitutional scheme than were the speech rights of ordinary contributors.
The Court did not consider the possibility that the quantity of speech and
the diversity of speech move by different dynamics and in different
directions. The Court simply did not entertain the possibility that
41. Id. at 20-21.
A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and
his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support. The
quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with
the size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on the
undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing. At most, the size of the
contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of the contributor's
support for the candidate. A limitation on the amount of money a person may
give to a candidate or campaign organization thus involves little direct restraint
on his political communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of
support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the
contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues.
Id. at 21.
42. See id. at 24. "[T]he primary First Amendment problem raised by the Act's
contribution limitations is their restriction of one aspect of the contributor's freedom of
political association." Id. at 24-25.
43. See id. at 28.
44. See id. at 19.
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of
expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their
exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This is because virtually
every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the
expenditure of money. The distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet
entails printing, paper, and circulation costs. Speeches and rallies generally
necessitate hiring a hall and publicizing the event. The electorate's increasing
dependence on television, radio, and other mass media for news and
information has made these expensive modes of communication indispensable
instruments of effective political speech.
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increasing the quantity of speech might limit the diversity of the speech.
To have done so would have brought the Court to the concentrated wealth
concerns it had ignored.4"
The Court found that the main purpose of the expenditure limitations
was to contain the "allegedly skyrocketing costs of political campaigns"
46
but held that this purpose is insufficient to sustain limitations on
expenditures.47 The Court rejected any connection between expenditure
limitations and the government interest in preventing corruption-the
rationale it had relied on in sustaining the contributions limitations.4 ' The
reasons for doing so vividly illustrate the conceptual incoherence of the
Court's contribution-expenditure distinction.
The Court based its rejection of expenditure limitations on a
conceptual catch-22. It found that statute's limitation on expenditures
"relative to a clearly identifiable candidate"49 was impermissibly vague
unless it was construed as applying only to those expenditures expressly
advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for public
office." In the Court's view, this reading of the expenditure limitation
undermined the provision's usefulness in preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption.5' The Court reasoned:
45. See supra Part I.C.
46. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57 (noting that the Court of Appeals had emphasized the
increase in campaign costs, while the appellants countered that campaign costs had risen
less dramatically than had total expenditures for commercial advertising). For a debate
on this comparison with contemporary numbers, see MAGLEBY & NELSON, supra note 11,
at 27-47.
47. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57.
[T]he mere growth in the cost of federal election campaigns in and of itself
provides no basis for governmental restrictions on the quantity of campaign
spending and the resulting limitations on the scope of federal campaigns. The
First Amendment denies government the power to determine that spending to
promote one's political views is wasteful, excessive, or unwise. In the free
society ordained by our Constitution it is not the government, but the
people-individually as citizens and candidates and collectively as associations
and political committees-who must retain control over the quantity and range
of debate on public issues in a political campaign.
Id.
48. See id. at 45-46.
49. Id. at 39-40 (construing I.R.C. § 608(e)(1) (1986)).
50. See id. at 44. The Court acknowledged that the distinction between issue
advocacy and express advocacy was not clear, stating that "the distinction between
discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of election or defeat may often dissolve
in practical application: Candidates, especially incumbents, are intimately tied to public
issues involving legislative proposals and governmental actions." Id. at 42.
51. See id. at 45.
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The exacting interpretation of the statutory language necessary to
avoid unconstitutional vagueness thus undermines the limitation's
effectiveness as a loophole-closing provision by facilitating
circumvention by those seeking to exert improper influence upon
a candidate or officeholder. It would naively underestimate the
ingenuity and resourcefulness of persons and groups desiring to
buy influence to believe that they would have much difficulty
devising expenditures that skirted the restriction on express
advocacy of election or defeat but nevertheless benefited the
candidate's campaign. Yet no substantial societal interest would
be served by a loophole-closing provision designed to check
corruption that permitted unscrupulous persons and organizations
to expend unlimited sums of money in order to obtain improper
influence over candidates for elective office.52
This analysis of the dangers of corruption through independent
expenditures threatened to undermine the distinction the Court sought to
maintain between contributions and expenditures. The Court sought to
bolster the distinction in two ways. First, it asserted that independent
expenditures do not pose a significant danger of corruption or the
appearance of corruption. 3 This argument rested solely on the Court's
highly circumscribed concept of corruption as a direct and explicit quid
pro quo.54 Second, the Court argued that all expenditures are independent
unless they are coordinated with or controlled by the candidate. Merely
benefitting a candidate does not undermine the independent quality of the
expenditure and does not create the possibility of corruption in the same
way as a contribution does.55  The only purpose of a limitation on
independent expenditures would be to level the political playing field-a
purpose the Court rejected. 6 The Court noted that an expenditure made
by another person but controlled by a candidate will be treated as a
contribution to the candidate. 7
The Court is remarkably reticent about control by or coordination with
the candidate sufficient to transform an independent expenditure into a
contribution. It concludes, in a footnote, that the Act's purposes and the
legislative history was to treat "all expenditures placed in cooperation with
or with the consent of a candidate, his agents, or an authorized committee
52. Id.
53. See id. at 45-47.
54. See id.; see also supra Part I.C.
55. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46-47.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 46.
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of the candidate as contributions."" Remarkably, the Court concluded that
independent expenditures were likely to be of only limited benefit to
candidates and thus posed little danger of corruption.
The Court found that contribution limitations was the primary defense
against corruption.60 Yet, the Court's reasoning becomes completely
circular when it looks to the possibility of independent expenditures to
sustain the constitutionality of the contribution limitations. The quantity
of political speech, which the Court treats as the constitutional touchstone
of the analysis, is unlimited by the contribution limitations only because
contributors are free to make independent expenditures as well as
contributions. Independent expenditures were considered the speech of the
person making the expenditure. Control by the candidate or coordination
with the candidate meant that the speech was no longer that of the person
supplying the money but instead became the speech of the person receiving
and controlling the money. By extension, the Court held that a candidate
could spend unlimited amounts of his own money because a candidate
could not bribe himself.
61
Three of the dissents rejected the Court's distinction between
contributions and expenditures. Justice Blackmun asserted that it is
impossible to make a principled distinction between expenditures and
contributions. 62 Justice Burger 63 and Justice White64 delineate in their
dissents the twin attacks on the distinction from those, like Justice Burger,
58. Id. at 47 n.53.
59. See id. at 47.
Unlike contributions, such independent expenditures may well provide little
assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed may prove
counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an
expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of
the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures
will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.
Id.
60. See id.
61. See id.; but see id. at 289-90 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (finding a compelling
state interest in levelling the political playing field as between wealthy candidates and
candidates without personal wealth, an enterprise he found compelled by the Court's
sustaining limitations on contributions).
62. See id. at 290 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I am not persuaded that the Court
makes, or indeed is able to make, a principled constitutional distinction between the
contribution limitations, on the one hand, and the expenditure limitations, on the other,
that are involved here.").
63. See id. at 235-57 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
64. See id. at 257-90 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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who would also abolish the limitations on contributions, and those, like
Justice White, who would also impose limitations on expenditures.
Buckley misdescribes a political contribution transaction in ways that
are so patently apparent that the misdescription has become the basis of the
current sense that campaign finance practices are illegitimate. The Court
would have us believe that an expenditure made to advocate the election
or defeat of a candidate consistent with the express advocacy standard is
not a contribution to the beneficiary candidate's campaign. By making
treatment as a contribution turn on control or coordination and by ignoring
transfers for the benefit of a candidate, the Buckley Court ensured that this
case would become the basis of abuse and cynicism.
The Court had justified its contribution-expenditure distinction by
treating contributions as implicating associational rights and expenditures
as implicating speech rights. Yet, the Court also found that contributions
were forms of constitutionally protected political speech. In effect,
Buckley ranks the speech of large contributors (who are more likely to
have the sophistication to make their contributions in the form of
expenditures) as entitled to a greater level of Constitutional protection than
that of small contributors who are likely to make conventional
contributions. In consequence, Buckley exacerbates precisely the kind of
corruption it proclaims as the rationale for upholding the limitations on
contributions. Its subsequent holding prohibiting corporations from
making direct or indirect independent expenditures is a tacit
acknowledgement of its error.65
As a result of the contribution-expenditure distinction, the essence of
campaign finance planning is to treat as many transfers of value as possible
as expenditures, not as contributions. A transfer directly to the candidate
is a contribution. A transfer for the benefit of a candidate may be either
a contribution or an independent expenditure, depending on the degree of
control the candidate or her campaign committee exercises over the
money. "Soft money" contributions to political parties are not limited at
all because they are treated as neither contributions nor expenditures under
the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA"). The terms themselves
have taken on the quality of a jurisprudential fantasia akin to Alice's
conversations with the Mad Hatter.66 The words have become abstracted
65. See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
66. In this analogy, the Court is the White Rabbit and candidates and those with
enough money to purchase access view the scene with the inscrutable satisfaction of the
Cheshire Cat. The voters, it is hoped, have the resilience of Alice.
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from their common meanings and from any possible empirical connection
to the transactions of modem politics.67
B. Corporate Money in Campaign Finance: The Statutory Regime
Corporations may transfer value to candidates in more ways than are
initially apparent, but some barriers remain. With regard to corporations,
the primary barriers are the prohibitions on direct contributions to
candidates and independent expenditures which expressly advocate the
election or defeat of a particular candidate. While corporations are able
to make unlimited soft money contributions to political parties, the
limitations posed by current election law create incentives for including
conduits in any political fund-raising apparatus.
1. Limiting Hard Money Contributions
A corporation may not contribute any amount that is used by a
candidate or a candidate's committee for direct political expenditures.68
This prohibition on so called "hard money" extends to "any corporation
whatever" and covers "a contribution or expenditure in connection with
any election," including actions by political conventions or caucuses held
to select candidates.6 9 The FECA further provides that it is unlawful for
any corporate officer or director to "consent" to any prohibited
contribution or expenditure.7' It is also unlawful "for any candidate,
political committee, or other person knowingly to accept or receive any
67. Ongoing reporting of the transactions that both parties engaged in to finance the
1996 campaign may compel a new look at the transactional realities of campaign finance.
Whether such a new exposure to fact results in realigning the statutory categories of the
FECA remains highly problematic. See Ruth Marcus & Charles R. Babcock, The System
Cracks Under the Weight of Cash, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1997, at Al (reporting that the
1996 campaign cost $2.7 billion).
68. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a), (b)(2) (1994).
69. Id. § 441b(a).
It is unlawful for any ... corporation whatever, or any labor organization, to
make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election at which
presidential and vice presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or
a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, Congress are to be voted for, or in
connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to
select candidates for any of the foregoing offices.
Id.
70. See id.
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contribution prohibited by this section. "" Prohibitions on contributions
by government contractors are stated separately.72
A "contribution or expenditure" includes "any direct or indirect
payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money, or any
services, or anything of value (except a loan of money by a national or
State bank made in accordance with the applicable banking laws and
regulations and in the ordinary course of business) to any candidate,
campaign committee, or political party or organization, in connection with
any election to any of the offices referred to in this section . . . ."7 A
corporation's communication "to its stockholders and executive and
administrative personnel and their families" is not a prohibited contribution
or expenditure.7a
The prohibition on political contributions by corporations pre-dates the
FECA.7' The Supreme Court upheld these restrictions on corporate
political contributions in a series of cases dealing with the political
activities of labor organizations. 76 The prohibition on corporate political
activity was grounded on all three rationales set forth above, but the
effects of concentrated wealth were given significant attention. 7
The first departure from this position came in First National Bank v.
Bellotti, which involved corporate contributions to an organization that
attempted to defeat a referendum issue in Massachusetts. 78 In this case,
the Court relied on Buckley in finding that the prevention of corruption or
the appearance of corruption was the most important consideration
regarding limitations on political speech. 79 Finding that referendum issues
did not pose the same danger of corruption that candidate elections did, the
71. Id.
72. See id. § 441c(a).
73. Id. § 441b(b)(2) (underscoring the importance of being able to argue plausibly
that an intermediary is acting independently). See infra Part IV for an analysis of
conduits.
74. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (providing the same exception for a labor
organization's communication with members and their families).
75. The current provisions of § 441b were first enacted in 1907 in the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act, 34 Stat. 864.
76. See Pipefitters v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972); United States v.
Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567 (1957); United States v. C.I.O., 335 U.S. 106
(1948).
77. See supra Part I.C (discussing the rationale for limiting corporate political
contributions).
78. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
79. See id. at 789-92.
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Court held that corporations could contribute to the referendum fund. 80
The Court rejected as paternalistic the idea that corporations would enjoy
a disproportionate voice if permitted to make political contributions 8' and
held that disclosure would prevent any limited problems of corruption that
might arise. 2 The Court rejected arguments that the corporate form itself
sustained or required special limitations on political contributions.
Nevertheless, the Court limited its holding to the facts of the case, which
did not involve contributions to the campaign of a candidate for public
office.
Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented on
grounds that corporate speech should not be equated to individual speech.83
Justice White found that corporate speech does not raise any issue with
respect to the self-expression of the speaker and is thus entitled to a lesser
level of First Amendment protection. 84 The dissent also found that
limitations on corporate speech posed lesser limits on the public's right to
hear. 85 The dissent also raised issues of concentrated wealth86 and the use
of corporate assets to propagate the political views of managers.87
While the statutory prohibition on corporate hard money contributions
seems absolute, Bellotti suggests that the Supreme Court may be prepared
to extend First Amendment protections to corporate political contributions.
In addition, current campaign finance practices may mean that the statutory
prohibition has little continuing force in light of the planning possibilities
presented by the absence of limitations on corporate soft money
contributions to political parties, the expanded opportunities opened to
political parties to make independent expenditures, and the possibilities
presented by including conduits in fund-raising structures.
2. Independent Expenditures by Corporations
Federal election law imposes stricter limitations on contributions to
candidates than it imposes on expenditures made by others for the benefit
of candidates. As discussed above, this result arises from the Buckley
80. See id. at 789-95.
81. See id. at 789-92.
82. See id. at 792 n.32; see also infra Part lI.B.5 (discussing disclosure requirements
in candidate elections); Part VI (discussing the implications of relying on disclosure).
83. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 803 (White, J., dissenting).
84. See id. at 806-07.
85. See id. at 807.
86. See id. at 809-12.
87. See id. at 818.
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Court's contribution-expenditure distinction based on control by rather than
benefit to the candidate. 8"
Despite this distinction, corporations may not make independent
expenditures directly or indirectly through a trade association in which
they are members.89 In Austin,' the Court held that a trade association
could not use treasury funds9' to place a newspaper ad urging support for
a particular candidate in an upcoming election for state office.92 The trade
association was organized as a corporation and its members were taxable
corporate entities. The Court distinguished this organization from that in
Massachusetts Citizens for Life on grounds that the chamber of commerce
served multiple purposes, while Massachusetts Citizens for Life was
organized for the sole purpose of opposing abortion. Consequently,
members who wished to leave the chamber of commerce in Austin would
face a greater burden than members who might wish to leave
Massachusetts Citizens for Life.
The restrictive effect of Austin depends on the scope of the activity
subsumed under the definition of an independent expenditure. Federal
election law is by no means clear, consistent, or precise in delineating
what constitutes an independent expenditure. The FECA defines an
independent expenditure as:
an expenditure by a person expressly advocating the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate which is made without
cooperation or consultation with any candidate, or any authorized
committee or agent of such candidate, and which is not made in
88. Though the Court did not discuss corporations, neither did it expressly exclude
them. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
89. Trade associations are exempt from entity-level tax. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(6)
(1986). Members of trade associations are typically for-profit, taxable corporations, but
some have individual members as well. Dues may be deductible if they are considered
ordinary and necessary business expenses within the meaning of I.R.C. § 162, but no
amount of dues used for political activities may be deducted. For an analysis of trade
associations, see HILL & KIRSCHTEN, supra note 4, at ch. 7.
90. 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (illustrating the dysfunctional quality of the contribution-
expenditure distinction since it prohibits an expenditure without fully analyzing it as a
contribution).
91. See id. at 668-89. The organization involved operated a well-funded PAC but
had reached its limit on contributions to the candidate in question. See id.; see also id.
at 676 n.7 (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing the economic strength of the affiliated
PAC).
92. See id. at 655 n. I (involving a state election laws comparable to federal election
laws).
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concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, any candidate, or
any authorized committee or agent of such candidate.93
This definition of an independent expenditure is not fully consistent
with the definitions in the provisions imposing limitations. The dissonance
in statutory language occurs in the provisions specifying that certain
expenditures will be treated as contributions. The issue in both cases is
the nature and extent of the coordination between the contributor and the
candidate. This statutory dissonance would have been avoided and there
would have been uniform treatment had the statute simply cross-referenced
the definition of an independent expenditure. Having not pursued this
approach to statutory drafting, the FECA has created uncertainty about the
applicability of the definition of an independent expenditure and about the
latitude for shared efforts between ostensibly independent sources of funds
making their own expenditures and the candidate.
The first, and more generally applicable, of these provisions classifies
certain expenditures as contributions in language that follows the language
of the general definition of an independent expenditure. Thus,
"expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert,
with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized
political committees, or their agents, shall be considered to be a
contribution to such candidate. 9
A second and distinct provision applies to expenditures by political
parties. 95 In this case, special limitations apply to "'expenditures in
connection with'" candidates for federal office.96 It is far from clear that
parties are subject to the same standard of coordination when determining
whether their expenditures are independent expenditures or contributions
to a candidate's campaign. This is an important question in its own terms.
It becomes even more important because parties may receive soft money
contributions from corporations.
Political parties' latitude in using funds for the benefit of candidates
without having the amounts treated as contributions subject to limitation
broadened when the Supreme Court held that the Colorado Republican
Party had made independent expenditures, and not contributions, in a
series of advertisements attacking a Democratic candidate for the United
States Senate at a time when the Republican Party had not yet chosen its
93. 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1986).
94. Id. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i).
95. See id. § 441a(d). See also Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v.
Federal Election Comm'n, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996).
96. Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2314.
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candidate in that race. 97 In this case of first impression, the absence of a
Republican candidate was not the issue. Rather, the case turned on the
question of coordination, and the distinction between an indirect
expenditure by a political party and an indirect expenditure by some
individual or entity other than a political party. The Supreme Court's
decision in Colorado Republican represents the conceptual cul de sac of
Buckley. Faced with this problem, the plurality chose to remand for
evidentiary finding on coordination. Justices Rehnquist, Thomas and
Scalia found the expenditure limitations on political party expenditures
facially unconstitutional. In due course, the Court will again face the
question unless the District Court finds no evidence of coordination. The
Court discussed this distinction in terms of which type of independent
expenditure posed the greater risk of corruption in the narrow sense in
which that term was used in Buckley. Because these issues had not been
considered below, the Court remanded the case for a factual determination
with respect to coordination. 8
One example of a controversy surrounding such independent
expenditures is whether President Clinton violated election law in early
1996 by playing a role in shaping Democratic National Committee
television advertisements supporting his re-election. 9  Similar
controversies arose over funds spent by various groups, as well as by the
Republican National Committee, to support the Dole campaign after it
reached its spending limit for the primary elections in March 1996.00 The
Dole campaign could not claim its federal support for the general election
until Dole had been officially nominated at the party convention in August
1996.
3. Soft Money
A corporation may use corporate treasury funds to make direct
contributions to political parties for use in party-building activities. These
97. See id. at 2310.
98. It remains to be seen how broadly the Court intends this opinion to be read. The
issue arises with respect to the political advertising efforts of interest groups ranging from
the AFL-CIO on behalf of Democratic Party candidates to Christian Coalition activities
on behalf of Republican candidates.
99. See BOB WOODWARD, THE CHOICE 235-39, 436-37 (1996).
100. See Jane Fritsch, Dole's Aides Are Counting Ways To Keep Campaign Cash
Flowing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1996, at Al; Ruth Marcus, A Vote-for-Dole Ad By
Another Name?, WASH. POST, June 1, 1996, at Al; Katharine Q. Seelye, Until
Convention, Dole Faces A Budget Squeeze of His Own, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1996, at
Al; Gerald F. Seib & John Harwood, GOP Chairman Moves To Drum Up Cash, Set
Themes for November, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 1996, at Al.
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so-called soft money contributions are not subject to any limitation. The
FECA reaches this result by limiting a "contribution" subject to limitation
as "any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything
of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election
for Federal office."'01 If the transfer of value is not made for the purpose
of influencing an election, it is not a contribution. Thus, a transfer of
value to a political party is not a contribution if it is used for party-
building rather than to support identifiable candidates directly. The
planning challenge is to define party-building broadly.0 2 If the party
simply deposits the money in the candidate's campaign checking account,
it is a contribution of "hard money" subject to limitation.'0 3 If the party
uses the corporation's money for voter education or registration or to
enhance the organizational capacity of the party, it is a soft money
contribution not subject to limitation.
The distinction between hard money and soft money is thus important
to both the corporate contributor and the party recipient. Because all the
activities of American political parties are undertaken for the purpose of
electing candidates, any distinction between electoral activity and party-
building is tenuous and problematic.'4 Parties may fund voter registration
with soft money, including corporate contributions of soft money, if they
101. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i) (1986). It is paradoxical that this definition of a
contribution, which turns on whether the contribution influences an election and which
thus seems initially more inclusive than the definitions of a contribution as money
controlled by the candidate and not as money used for the benefit of a candidate, even in
the absence of control by or coordination with the candidate.
102. For purposes of the FECA, a political party encompasses a variety of
committees such as the congressional campaign committee and the senatorial campaign
committee of each party as well as the party's national committee and the committee of
each state party. These organizations, each with its own agenda and controlled by
different political leaders with their own ambitions, operate both cooperatively and
competitively. Nevertheless, the structural complexity provides opportunities for the
creative movement of funds so that party structures become conduits themselves.
103. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2) (1994).
104. Political scientists have long decried the programmatic indistinctness of
American political parties. See, e.g., RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM:
THE RISE OF LEGITMATE OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1840 (1969); CHARLES
EDWARD MERIAM & HAROLD FonE GosNEU, THE AMERCAN PARTY STYIEM: AN INIMODUCION
To THE nSUDy OF PotrcAL PAR=S IN THi UnH STATES (1929); AUSN RANNEY, TME DcntNE
OF RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT. ITS ORIGINS AND PRESENT STATE (1962); E.E.
SCHATSCHNE3DER, PARTY GOVERNMENr (1942); PER W. SCHRAMM & BRADFORD P. WILSON,
AMERICAN POLTICALPARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONALPOLITICS (1993); WOODROWWILSON,
CONGRESSIONALGOVERNMENTI A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1885). Foraneffortby
leading political scientists to address the problems they perceived in American political
parties, see QUINCY WRIGHT, THE AMERICAN POLITICALSCIENCE REVIEW (1950 & Supp. 44
1950).
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do not use registration drives selectively to enhance the electoral prospects
of candidates of that party.1
0 5
These distinctions are elusive. Consider, for example, a voter
registration drive conducted at a popular supermarket chain with stores in
all the neighborhoods of a metropolitan area. Is the voter registration
drive a party-building activity that can properly be funded by soft money
contributions only if the party conduct its efforts at every store in the
chain? At most of the stores? Only in the areas where it has previously
done well? Only in areas where it has previously done poorly?
These questions become even more acute when the activity is voter
education and outreach. A national political party with an incumbent
president or a majority in one or both houses of Congress will be hard
pressed to devise voter education that does not at the same time enhance
the electoral prospects of these incumbents and other candidates who
associate themselves with the incumbents.
Even more problematic is the inclusion of voter turnout in party-
building. 0 6 One interpretation would limit funding of voter turnout efforts
with soft money to those efforts that are not designed to enhance the
turnout of those likely to support the party conducting the voter turnout
effort. This is unlikely. Identifying party supporters and getting them to
the polls is the heart of voter turnout. Indeed, one could argue that simply
getting any and all voters to go to the polls does not build the party, which
requires precisely the kind of targeting that also enhances the electoral
prospects of particular candidates affiliated with the party and running
under its banner in the election.
While the Court has not addressed this issue directly, it has addressed
it indirectly through a bootstrap argument based on Bellotti and Buckley.
The argument is that the same danger of corruption or the appearance of
corruption does not exist in the case of soft money contributions, including
corporate contributions made to political parties for party-building, as it
does in the case of hard money contributions made directly to candidates.
These arguments are grounded in the concept of corruption as limited to
cases of a precise quid pro quo.
Even by these attenuated standards of corruption, soft money became
controversial during early 1996 when it was discovered the tobacco
companies had made significant soft money contributions to the Republican
National Committee ("RNC") and that the head of the RNC had, in an
apparent quid pro quo, sought to limit state legislative action contrary to
105. Parties may engage in the same voter education and voter registration activities
as I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations.
106. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(xii).
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the interests of the tobacco company contributors.'0 7 This apparent
connection underscores the relationship between campaign contributions
and lobbying access. The very relaxed soft money standard means that
corporations may contribute directly to political parties and obtain the kind
of support that direct contributions to political candidates might afford.
Indeed, the RNC-tobacco company case suggests that soft money
contributions may be even more cost-effective than contributions to
individual candidates if the purpose of the contribution is to influence
legislation and not necessarily to support the election of particular
candidates.' 0 In this process, electoral outcomes become marginal.
Federal election law does not provide any means for ensuring that soft
money contributions are not used for the kind of indirect support for a
candidate that other parts of the FECA seem designed to prevent. In
practice, soft money contributions blur into independent expenditures by
political parties. This arises because parties have been treated in the same
manner as candidate committees in terms of making independent
expenditures, while only parties may receive soft money. The ability to
receive soft money should be carefully considered in permitting the parties
the broad latitude they currently enjoy in making independent
expenditures. In the absence of any realistic grasp of political money, the
Supreme Court rests its political speech jurisprudence on certain
unarticulated assumptions about the perfection of accounting in segregating
types of political money.
107. See Glenn Frankel, Tobacco Industry Switches Brands; PoliticalDonations Shift
to Republicans AfterFavoring Democrats, WASH. PosT, Mar. 15, 1996, at Al (reporting
that Haley Barbour, Chair of the RNC, contacted the Republican Speaker of the Arizona
House of Representatives, Mark Killian, in a futile attempt to persuade him to support a
bill that would have permitted the state to override tough local restrictions on cigarette
smoking in public places but Killian instead killed the bill); see also Kris Mayes &
Michael Murphy, Tobacco Money Access Questioned; Donations Benefit Arizona's
Politicians, Apiz. REPUBLIC, Oct. 23, 1996, at Al (reporting that Barbour successfully
persuaded Arizona Governor Fife Symington to withdraw the state's health-care program
for the poor from litigation to win reimbursement from tobacco companies for the health-
care costs incurred by the state in treating tobacco-linked diseases). Barbour met with
Governor Symington the night before the Governor made his announcement. See id.; see
also Adrianne Flynn, Did Meeting Sway Governor? Symington, GOP Chief Deny
Discussing Suit, ARiz. REPUBLIC, Oct. 23, 1996, at A2 (reporting that tobacco interests
contributed $1.7 million to the RNC and more than $2.1 million to all Republicans during
the 1996 election cycle).
108. The larger question, and one that is not explored in this paper, is why any
interest, whether it be tobacco companies or cancer patients, should feel that they have
to pay an access charge to have their positions heard in public legislative arena. In short,
why should the metaphor of a marketplace of ideas be linked with the reality of a
marketplace for access?
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4. Corporate Political Action Committees
Although corporations may not make hard money contributions or
independent expenditures with treasury funds, they may establish,
administer, and solicit contributions to a separate segregated fund,
commonly called a political action committee ("PAC").' 09 The PAC may
make contributions directly to candidates for public office. "I Corporations
that contract with the government may also organize and operate PACs. "'
A corporation may not contribute corporate treasury funds to its PAC for
such hard money contributions." 2  A PAC is to be funded with
contributions from the corporation's "stockholders and their families and
its executive or administrative personnel and their families."" 3 Through
its ability to appoint the board of the PAC the corporation may control
PAC operations, including making decisions about which candidates the
PAC will support. One corporation may establish and operate more than
one PAC, but its contributions to any candidate will be aggregated for
purposes of the contribution limitations." 4 Contributions to any one
candidate are limited to $5,000,"5 indexed for inflation, per election." 6
Corporate PACs are subject to the same registration, reporting, and
disclosure requirements as are political committees." 7 The name of the
PAC must include the name of the connected organization.11
8
109. See, e.g., ANN B. MATASAR, CORPORATE PACs AND FEDERAL CAMPAIGN
FINANCING LAWS: USE OR ABUSE OF POWER? (1986); LARRY J. SABATO, PAC POWER:
INSIDE THE WORLD OF POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES (1984).
110. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (b)(2)(C) (1994) (providing for "the establishment,
administration, and solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized
for political purposes by a corporation, labor organization, membership organization,
cooperative, or corporation without capital stock").
111. See id. §441c(b).
112. A corporation may use corporate treasury funds for the administrative expenses
of its PAC so that the entire amount collected for political contributions may be used for
that purpose.
113. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(A)(i). "'Executive or administrative personnel' means
individuals employed by a corporation who are paid on a salary, rather than hourly, basis
and who have policy making, managerial, professional, or supervisory responsibilities."
Id. § 441b(b)(4)(D)(7).
114. See id. § 441a(a)(5).
115. Id. § 441a(a)(2)(A).
116. The inflation adjustment is based on indexing to the consumer price index under
§ 441a(c).
117. See generally 2 U.S.C. §§ 433-434 (1986).
118. See id. §432(e)(5).
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Nevertheless, PAC contributions are not attributed to the connected
organization.
Conduits are more desirable than PACs because they offer the same
opportunity for control without any of the limitations applicable to PACs.
A corporation may use its corporate treasury funds in funding the conduit.
In addition, exempt organization conduits do not need to report their
activities to the Federal Election Commission ("FEC") and are not
required to disclose their contributors. In addition, corporate transfers to
certain exempt conduits enjoy more favorable tax treatment than do
political contributions or transfers to PACs."19
5. Reporting and Disclosure Requirements
Federal election law imposes substantial reporting and disclosure
requirements on authorized committees, principal campaign committees,
multi-candidate political committees, and individuals or groups that make
contributions or independent expenditures. 20 The detail in which the
FECA specifies the reporting requirements serves as a realistic portrait of
the political money trail. To protect the integrity of the reporting
requirements, the FECA prohibits making contributions in the name of
another.12 ' In addition, it prohibits the anonymous publication and
distribution of materials expressly advocating the election or defeat of a
candidate or the anonymous solicitation of political contributions.'22 One
of the duties of the FEC is to ensure proper disclosure of these reports.2
While the Buckley Court severely restricted the limitations imposed
under the FECA, it upheld the disclosure requirements. 24 While
recognizing that "compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on
privacy of association and beliefs guaranteed by the First Amendment," l5
the Court found that three categories of governmental interests sustain the
conclusion that "[tlhe disclosure requirements, as a general matter, directly
119. See infra Part IV.
120. See generally 2 U.S.C. § 434.
121. See id. § 441f.
122. See id. § 441d. But see infra Part V.A. for the Supreme Court's decision in
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (upholding the right to
distribute anonymously materials urging support for one side of a referendum issue).
123. See id. § 437g. The FEC is widely reported as unable to perform its public
disclosure duties, as well as its regulatory duties. During the 104th Congress, the House
leadership called for disclosure as an alternative to regulation but at the same time limited
staffing and funding for the public disclosure office of the FEC. See Benjamin Weiser
& Bill McAllister, The Little Agency That Can't, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1997, at Al.
124. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60-84 (1976) (per curiam).
125. Id. at 64.
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serve substantial governmental interests."' 26 First, disclosure provides
information necessary to allow voters "to place each candidate in the
political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis
of party labels and campaign speeches." 27 Second, disclosure deters
corruption and the appearance of corruption. Consistent with its view of
corruption as a quid pro quo, the Court concluded that "[a] public armed
with information about a candidate's most generous supporters is better
able to detect any post-election special favors that may be given in
return. 2 8 Third, the Court found that the record keeping, reporting and
disclosure requirements were essential to enforcement of the contribution
limitations which it had found constitutional.'29 In sum, the Court found
a government interest "in deterring the 'buying' of elections and the undue
influence of large contributors on officeholders."130 The Court is far more
inclined to see dangers from concentrated wealth when the issue is
disclosure rather than limitations on expenditures.
Despite its realistic view of the dangers of concentrated wealth, the
Court nevertheless modified what was then § 434(e) of the FECA. As
enacted and then in effect, this section required disclosure of contributions
or expenditures made "for the purpose of ... influencing" the nomination
or election of candidates for public office.' 3 ' The Court held that the
phrase "for the purpose of. . . influencing" was impermissibly vague,
especially in light of the criminal penalties provided in the FECA. 132 The
problem arose with respect to reporting expenditures, not with respect to
reporting contributions. 33 To resolve this issue, the Court restricted
reporting of expenditures to those expenditures that involved express
advocacy and not those that constituted issue advocacy. ' 34 The Court
reasoned that requiring the disclosure of expenditures that expressly
advocate the election of a particular candidate might have been
impermissible if its only purpose was to prevent corruption or the
126. Id. at 66, 68.
127. Id. at 66-67. This view assumes, of course, that the universe of contributors
is divided along lines defined by party affiliation and does not fit a reality in which the
contributors with the greatest economic power simply give to each side in amounts
sufficient to assure access whatever the electoral result.
128. Id. at 67.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 70.
131. Id. at 77. This provision as amended to conform with the holding in Buckley
is now 2 U.S.C. § 434(c)(1) (1994).
132. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 76-82.
133. See id. at 80-81.
134. See id. at 80.
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appearance of corruption, but the Court pointed to the government's
informational interest in permitting voters to know who is supporting
various candidates. The Court said of such independent expenditures,
"[tihe corruption potential of these expenditures may be significantly
different, but the informational interest can be as strong as it is in
coordinated spending, for disclosure helps voters to define more of the
candidate's constituencies." 3 5
Conduits defeat the disclosure requirements. A contribution made
through a conduit may not be reported on grounds that the conduit is not
engaged in a political activity."' If the conduit reports a contribution or
independent expenditure, it masks the true source of the funds. Such
masking permits a candidate to use a corporation's money but prevents the
voters from knowing about the contribution and drawing from this
information whatever conclusions they choose. Such masking defeats
information about the dissonance between a candidate's message and her
funding that the Buckley Court found to be one of the primary rationales
for requiring reporting and disclosure of both contributions and
independent expenditures.
137
III. TAX LAW PROHIBITIONS ON DEDUCTIBILITY OF
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
Political contributions are not deductible for federal income tax
purposes.'38 Understanding the purpose and the technical mechanisms of
these provisions facilitates understanding of attempts to claim deductions
for political contributions by recharacterizing them as business expenses
or as charitable contributions. "' In addition, understanding the underlying
theory of political money that serves as the basis of the tax law treatment
highlights the conceptual impoverishment of election law by Buckley and
its progeny. As is explained below, tax law prevents deductions for soft
money contributions and independent expenditures as well as for hard
money contributions.
The central purpose of the tax provisions is to prevent
recharacterization of political contributions as ordinary and necessary
business expenses. Section 162 expressly denies a deduction for "any
135. Id. at 81.
136. See infra Part IV.B (analyzing the use of exempt organizations to recharacterize
political activity as exempt activity).
137. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-68.
138. See generally I.R.C. §§ 161-197 (1997) (enumerating itemized deductions for
individuals and corporations). These sections list no deduction for political contributions.
139. See infra Part IV.B.
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amount paid or incurred in connection with participation in, or intervention
in, any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate
for public office."'" This prohibition encompasses amounts spent in
connection with such political activities rather than simply amounts that are
controlled by a candidate for public office. 141
In addition to such denial of a deduction for any direct political
expenditure, the Code denies a deduction for three types of indirect
political contributions-forgiveness of debts to candidates or political
parties, payments not expressly treated as political contributions made to
political parties, and dues or other payments to trade associations if the
trade association makes political expenditures. Each of these prohibitions
operates to prevent circumvention of the denial of deductions for direct
political contributions. This denial of deductions prevents contributors
from externalizing the cost of their political activities to other taxpayers. 142
Section 271 denies a deduction for bad debts or worthless securities
"by reason of the worthlessness of any debt owed by a political party." 1
43
This provision is intended to prevent a corporation from providing services
on credit or advancing funds to a political organization and then deducting
the debt as worthless under § 166, as a bad debt, or under § 165(g), as a
worthless security. The statute and the regulations thereunder distinguish
such disguised contributions from debts incurred in the ordinary course of
a corporation's trade or business.1
Consistent with this purpose, a political party is defined broadly to
include not only a political party"' and its national, state, or local
committee, 46 but also:
"a committee, association, or organization which accepts
contributions or makes expenditures for the purpose of influencing
or attempting to influence the election of presidential or vice-
140. I.R.C. § 162(e)(1)(B). This is essentially the same language used to express
the prohibition on political activity in I.R.C § 501(c)(3) (1986).
141. See I.R.C. § 162(e)(5)(C) (providing that "any amount paid or incurred for
research for, or preparation, planning, or coordination of, any activity described in
paragraph (1) shall be treated as paid or incurred in connection with such activity").
Paragraph (1) refers to § 162(e)(1), which sets forth the prohibition on deductions for
expenses for lobbying or electoral political activity. See id. § 162(e)(1).
142. The same issue arises with respect to corporate charitable contributions and to
the recharacterization of political contributions as charitable contributions. See generally
supra note 2.
143. I.R.C. § 271(a) (1997).
144. See Treas. Reg. § 1.271-1(a) (1996).
145. See I.R.C. § 271(b)(1)(A).
146. See id. § 271(b)(1)(B).
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presidential electors or of any individual whose name is presented
for election to any Federal, State or local elective public office,
whether or not such individual is elected." 47
The regulations provide that an organization which serves to facilitate
political activity by another organization or individual by serving as a
conduit will be treated as a political committee for purposes of § 271.48
While there is no guidance on point, the definition of a political committee
would seem to encompass any organization that would be treated as a
political organization for purposes of § 527 of the Code. It should also
encompass all organizations that must register with the FEC as political
committees. It is entirely possible that the definition of a political party
for purposes of § 271 is more inclusive than is the definition of § 527 or
of federal election law. For example, those organizations that do not meet
the de minimis exceptions of the FECA would still be treated as political
parties for purposes of § 271. In addition, contributions to organizations
that do not satisfy the requirements for exemption under § 527 would not
be deductible under § 271. However, any organization that is a § 527
political organization or that is subject to the requirements of federal
election law would also be a political party for purposes of § 271.
An organization that engages in activities which are "truly nonpartisan
in nature" will not be treated as a political party for purposes of § 271.49
The regulations give an example of a committee or group that:
is organized merely to inform the electorate as to the identity and
experience of all candidates involved, to present on a
nonpreferential basis the issues or views of the parties or
147. Id. § 271(b)(1)(C).
148. See Treas. Reg. § 1.271-1(b)(1).
It is immaterial whether the contributions or expenditures are accepted or made
directly or indirectly. Thus, for example, a committee or other group is
considered to be a political party, if, although it does not expend any funds, it
turns funds over to another organization which does expend funds for the




An organization which engages in activities which are truly nonpartisan in
nature will not be considered a political party merely because it conducts
activities with respect to an election campaign if, under all the facts and
circumstances, it is clear that its efforts are not directed to the election of the
candidates of any particular party or parties or to the selection, nomination or
election of any particular candidate.
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candidates as described by the parties or candidates, or to provide
a forum in which the candidates are freely invited on a
nonpreferential basis to discuss or debate the issues. 50
Additional evidence of the intended scope of the § 271 denial of
deductibility is found in the broad definitions of both contribution and
expenditure for purposes of defining a political committee. A contribution
"includes a gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit, of money, or
anything of value, and includes a contract, promise, or agreement to make
a contribution, whether or not legally enforceable. " '51 An expenditure
"includes a payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift, of
money, or anything of value, and includes a contract, promise, or
agreement to make an expenditure, whether or not legally enforceable. "'
52
Section 271 provides an exception for ordinary commercial
transactions that are not disguised contributions."5 This exception applies
only to accrual-based taxpayers that accrue the receivable "on a bona fide
sale of goods or services" in the ordinary course of their trade or
business 154 and more than thirty percent of all receivables accrued in the
ordinary course of their trade or business were accrued from political
parties. ' This exception is available only if "the taxpayer made
substantial continuing efforts to collect on the debt. " 15 6 This exception
applies primarily to political consulting firms, advertising firms, and
polling firms that provide services to political campaigns in the course of
their ordinary trade or business and are not making disguised contributions
to the campaigns with which they contract.
Section 276 forbids deductions for corporate expenditures cast in the
light of advertising or other activity that might be construed as deductible
under § 162 as an ordinary or necessary business expense or under § 170
as a charitable contribution.
150. Id. This example tracks the requirements applicable to exempt organizations
that prepare voter guides or sponsor candidate debates.
151. I.R.C. § 271(b)(2). The same definition of a contribution applies for purposes
of I.R.C. § 276; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.271-1(b)(2) (1996).
152. I.R.C. § 271(b)(3). The same definition of an expenditure applies for purposes
of I.R.C. § 276. See Treas. Reg. § 1.271-1(b)(3) (1996).
153. See I.R.C. § 271(c).
154. Id. The accrual requirement means that the taxpayer will have taken the
receivable into income for the taxable year under the all events test of Treas. Reg. §
1.451-1(a) and will thus not be able to use the bad debt or worthless security deduction
to offset other income.
155. See id. § 271(c)(1).
156. Id. § 271(c)(2).
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The first of these disallowed deductions relates to "advertising in a
convention program of a political party, or in any other publication if any
part of the proceeds of such publication directly or indirectly inures (or is
intended to inure) to or for the use of a political party or a political
candidate." 17 For purposes of § 276, proceeds inure directly or indirectly
to a political party or political candidate "(a) if the party or candidate may
order the disposition of any part of such proceeds, regardless of what use
is actually made thereof, or (b) if any part of such proceeds is utilized by
any person for the benefit of the party or candidate." 58 If an event is
"sponsored by or identified with" a candidate or party, the proceeds of
such event are presumed to inure to the benefit of the candidate or party.'
Remote benefits are not treated as inuring to a candidate or party."
There are additional rules that apply in the case of inurement to a
political candidate. Proceeds inure to a candidate if they "may be used
directly or indirectly for the purpose of furthering his candidacy for
selection, nomination, or election to any elective public office"' 6' and they
"are not received by such candidate in the ordinary course of a trade or
business (other than the trade or business of holding elected public
157. Id. § 276(a)(1). Such expenditures may be deductible if they are used solely
for the convention and not for a campaign, if they would be otherwise deductible under
IRC § 162, and if they are reasonable in amount. See Treas. Reg. § 1.276-1(b)(2)
(1996). The same principles apply in the case of publications other than a convention
program. See id. § 1.276-1(c).
158. Treas. Reg. § 1.276-1(f)(3)(i) (providing also that these same conditions apply
in determining whether proceeds are intended to inure to a candidate or party).
159. See id.
160. See id.
[P]roceeds are not considered to directly or indirectly inure to the benefit of a
political party or political candidate if the benefit derived is so remote as to be
negligible or merely a coincidence of the relationship of a political candidate
to a trade or business profiting from an expenditure of funds. For example,
the proceeds of expenditures made by a taxpayer in the ordinary course of his
trade or business for advertising in a publication, such as a newspaper or
magazine, are not considered as inuring to the benefit of a political party or
political candidate merely because the publication endorses a particular political
candidate or candidates of a particular political party, the publisher
independently contributes to the support of a political party or candidate out of
his own personal funds, or the principal stockholder of the publishing firm is
a candidate for public office.
Id.
161. I.R.C. § 276(b)(2)(A); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.276-1(f)(3)(iii).
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office)." 62 The inurement concept contrasts with Buckley in treating as
contributions amounts that benefit a candidate as well as amounts a
candidate controls.
63
Proceeds will be treated as inuring to a political party if the party
"may order the disposition of any part of the proceeds of a publication or
event."' 64 The party need not use such proceeds for direct candidate
related activity. Any use of the funds by a political party, including such
soft money activities as voter registration or research, sustains such
disallowance of deductions. 6  As discussed more fully below, this
provision disallowing deductions for such activities is currently routinely
circumvented by conducting such activities through a § 501(c)(3)
organization. 
66
The second of these disallowed deductions under § 276 relates to
"admission to any dinner or program, if any part of the proceeds of such
dinner or program directly or indirectly inures (or is intended to inure) to
or for the use of a political party or a political candidate."' 67 The
regulations adopt a broad definition of a dinner or program. 68 The broad
162. I.R.C. § 276(b)(2)(B); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.276-1(f)(3)(iii) (providing "if
the proceeds received by a candidate exceed substantially the fair market value of the
goods furnished or services rendered by him, the proceeds are not received by the
candidate in the ordinary course of his trade or business"); Id. § 1.276-1(f)(3)(iv) ex.
4.
163. One reason is that there is no reason to distinguish between contributions and
expenditures for tax law purposes. Both contributions and expenditures might support
claims for deduction and I.R.C. § 276 denies deductions for either. However, the
distinction is important for understanding the treatment of conduits and the claims for
deduction that arise from the recharacterization of politics as charity.
164. Treas. Reg. § 1.276-1(f)(3)(ii).
165. See id.
[S]uch proceeds inure to the use of the party regardless of what the proceeds
are to be used for or that their use is restricted to a particular purpose unrelated
to the election of specific candidates for public office. Accordingly, where a
political party holds a dinner for the purpose of raising funds to be used in a
voter registration drive, voter education program, or nonprofit political research
program, partisan or nonpartisan, the proceeds are considered to directly or
indirectly inure to or for the use of the political party.
Id.
166. See infra Part IV.B.3. Even the Republican National Committee has an
affiliated § 501(c)(3) organization, the National Policy Forum, to make deductions
available to its core contributors.
167. I.R.C. § 276(a)(2).
168. See Treas. Reg. § 1.276-1(d) (defining a dinner or program to include "a gala,
dance, ball, theatrical or film presentation, cocktail, or other party, picnic, barbecue,
sporting event, brunch, tea, supper, auction, bazaar, reading, speech, forum, lecture,
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scope of this provision is also evident in the application of the broad
concept of inurement discussed above.'69 Thus, proceeds of events
occurring after an election or before the formal declaration of candidacy
are treated as inuring to a political candidate.
70
The third of these disallowed deductions under § 276 relates to
"admission to an inaugural ball, inaugural gala, inaugural parade, or
inaugural concert, or to any similar event which is identified with a
political party or political candidate."' 7' In this case, nondeductibility does
not rest on inurement but on being identified with a political party.
Consistent with the purpose of § 276, inaugural events are defined broadly
to include any type of event connected with an inauguration.7 2 The cost
of admission is also defined broadly to include all amounts paid in
connection with attendance. 
7
fashion show, concert, opening, meeting, gathering, or any similar event").
169. See I.R.C. § 276(a)(2) (referring to the definition of inurement in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.276-1(t)).
170. See id. § 1.276-1(f)(3)(iii).
[P]roceeds may so inure whether or not the expenditure sought to be deducted
was paid or incurred before the commencement of political activities with
respect to the selection, nomination, or election . . . has been made or has
taken place. For example, proceeds of an event which may be used by an
individual who, under the facts and circumstances at the time of the event, the
persons making expenditures in connection therewith generally believe will in
the reasonably foreseeable future run for a public office, and which may be
used in furtherance of such individual's candidacy, generally will be deemed
to inure (or to be intended to inure) to or for the use of a political candidate for
the purpose of furthering such individual's candidacy. Or, as another example,
proceeds of an event occurring after an election, which may be used by a
candidate in that election to repay loans incurred in directly or indirectly
furthering his candidacy, will be deemed to directly or indirectly inure (or to
be intended to inure) to or for the use of a political candidate for the purpose
of furthering his candidacy.
Id.
171. I.R.C. § 276(a)(3); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.276-1(e)(1) (stating that deductions
are also denied for equivalent events for losing candidates).
172. See Treas. Reg. § 1.276-1(e)(1) (stating the broad definition of a dinner or
program under Treas. Reg. § 1.276-1(d) applicable to an inaugural event).
173. See id. § 1.276-1(f)(4).
[T]he cost of admission to a dinner, program, or inaugural event includes all
charges, whether direct or indirect, for attendance and participation at such
function. Thus, for example, amounts spent to be eligible for door prizes, for
the privilege of sitting at the head table, or for transportation furnished as part
of such an event, or any separate charges for food or drink, are amounts paid
for admission.
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Tax law also denies a deduction for indirect political contributions
made in the form of dues to trade associations. 4 Such dues may be
deductible if they are connected with the corporation's business activity.' 75
This provision neither affects nor limits the charitable contribution
deduction of § 170 because it does not apply to contributions made to §
501(c)(3) organizations.176 In this sense, the limitations imposed under §
162(a)(3) make a § 501(c)(3) conduit even more valuable to a political
fund-raising structure.
IV. CORPORATE-CANDIDATE CONDUITS
Corporations made significant political contributions during the 1996
campaign. " The explosion of soft money in the 1996 election may appear
to suggest that candidates and corporations have no further need for
conduits as elements of campaign finance structures. Conduits, however,
offer advantages to both the candidate and to the corporation that the
various soft money arrangements do not. Candidates prefer to receive
contributions directly rather than having a party intermediary eligible to
receive corporate soft money determine the allocation of such amounts. I's
Donors,. including corporate donors, prefer to choose the specific
beneficiaries of their largesse.' Conduits provide a means of avoiding
174. See I.R.C. § 162(e)(1)(B) (denying a deduction for amounts paid or incurred
in connection with "participation in, or intervention in, any political campaign on behalf
of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office"). IRC § 162(e)(3) applies this
prohibition to dues paid to certain exempt organizations.
175. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15 (providing that such dues may be ordinary and
necessary business expenses within the meaning of IRC § 162(a) if they "bear a direct
relationship to the taxpayer's business and are made with a reasonable expectation of a
financial return commensurate with the amount of the donation").
176. See HILL & KIRSCHTEN, supra note 4, 7.04[3][b][1 1].
177. See John E. Yang & Howard Kurtz, Big Finns Lead Campaign Donations,
WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1996, at A32.
178. One of the many questions about soft money is whether, or to what extent, it
is in practice earmarked to particular candidates. Earmarking to a candidate is
inconsistent with the permissible party-building purposes of soft money. See supra Part
ll.B.3. The opportunity for earmarking arises from the holding in Buckley that there has
been no contribution unless the candidate does not simply benefit from the money but in
fact controls it. See supra Part II.A.
179. See Leslie Wayne, D'Amato Converted Donations To Help New York
Candidates, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1997, at Al (citing examples of the negative reactions
of donors to the National Republican Senatorial Committee upon learning that Senator
Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY) transferred funds contributed to aid Republican candidates for
the United States Senate to George Pataki's campaign for Governor of New York).
Senator D'Amato responded to reports of contributors' unhappiness over the transfer,
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the remaining limitations of election law. In the case of certain exempt
organization conduits, political contributions may even be tax deductible.
This section analyzes conduits in the context of the statutory mosaic
of election law and tax law prohibitions and possibilities set forth above.8 0
This section concludes with an analysis of the particular benefits offered
by exempt organizations as corporate-candidate conduits.
A. Defining and Identifying Conduits
Both election law and tax law provide that indirect contributions are
subject to the same limitations and restrictions as are direct
contributions.' l8  The FECA provides that "all contributions made by a
person, either directly or indirectly, on behalf of a particular candidate,
including contributions which are in any way earmarked or otherwise
directed through an intermediary or conduit to such candidate, shall be
treated as contributions from such person to such candidate."' 82 The
FECA requires that the conduit report "the original source and the
intended recipient" to the FEC as well as to the intended recipient.183
The issue is not to determine whether conduit transactions are
permissible-they are not-but to identify conduits. The structural
complexity of modem campaigns as well as of modem political parties'8
4
makes the task of identifying conduits particularly difficult.
Election law, despite its literal application to conduit arrangements, is
hampered by the contribution-expenditure distinction imposed by the Court
in Buckley.' s5 Tax law operates with a more fully developed body of
principles for analyzing transactions involving intermediary organizations
based on the principle that legal consequences of particular arrangements
stating "It's not necessary to tell people where their checks went .... There is nothing
wrong with that. We don't have an obligation to tell people. Money is fungible." Id.
180. See supra Parts II, III.
181. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1994); I.R.C. §§ 271, 276 (1997); see also supra Parts
I.B.1, III.
182. 2 U.S.C. § 441a (a)(8).
183. Id.
184. See Ira Chinoy, In Trades Between Party Committees, Not All Dollars are
Equal, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1997, at A7 (stating that political parties are not unitary
organizations but are themselves complex structures that transfer political funds among
their components).
185. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). For a discussion of Buckley, see supra Part H.B.
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and activities are based on their substance and not on their form, 86 and the
corollary that persons may not do indirectly what they cannot do
directly.8 7
The principle that substance, not form, determines the legal
consequences of structures and activities supports two broad types of
inquiries relating to conduit transactions. The first inquiry is whether
money that passes through an intermediary entity was earmarked by the
original contributor for a particular recipient. Tracing value flows, which
became famous during Watergate with Deepthroat's advice to "follow the
money," is one approach to identifying conduits.' 88 The second approach
is to focus on the intermediary organization to determine whether it should
be given legal significance as an independent person or whether it should
be ignored in the interest of basing legal consequences on substance and
not form.8 9 An organization may, however, serve as a conduit, even if
it would otherwise be treated as an independent organization that controls
its daily operations, if it simply transfers funds in a particular transaction
unrelated to its ordinary business activities."O
Tracing looks at the origin and destination of funds. Intermediary
transit points are ignored as matters of form rather than of substance. If
funds are earmarked for a particular purpose by the contributor, then the
intermediary organization's role is ignored and the contributor and the
186. See Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 332-33 (1945)
(holding that profits from property sale are taxable to a corporation as income despite a
corporation's declaration of a "liquidating dividend" followed by transfer of title);
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) (stating that without a business purpose,
structure that conforms to technical requirements of the IRC will not be given effect, and
the taxpayer will be deprived of the tax benefits following from the form); see also Joseph
Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Tacation, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 859 (1982).
187. This is the heart of the step transaction doctrine which, for tax purposes,
ignores intermediary steps in a transaction if each of the steps is interdependent and if no
one step would have been taken but for the knowledge that all of the other steps would
be taken to reach a pre-determined end result. See e.g., Helvering v. Elkhorn Coal Co.,
95 F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1938).
188. See JUDITH E. KINDELL & JOHN F. REILLY, ELECTION YEAR ISSUES, IRS
CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TExT (1992). The IRS has announced in
nonprecedential guidance that it will trace political contributions made through exempt
organizations.
189. See Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943); see also
HILL & KIRSCHTEN, supra note 4, 9.01 (discussing Moline Properties).
190. See Estate of Kluener v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.M. 1326 (1996); Bank of
America v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 544 (1950), gff'dper curiain 193 F. 2d 178 (9th Cir.
1951).
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recipient are treated as though they had dealt with each other directly.19 1
Analysis turns on whether the intermediary organization had the right to
control the use of the funds. 1
92
Determining the independent purposes, and thus organizational
existence, of the structures that appear to serve as conduits is consistent
with determining whether the organization's own purposes are being
served, or whether the organization is simply a means or a tool through
which another organization achieves its purposes."
These two factors, earmarking of funds and control of an
organization's operations, suggest a typology of organizations ranging
from independent organizations to pure conduits. An independent
organization defines its own purposes and activities and controls the use
of any money it receives. A pure conduit has no purposes of its own and
exercises no control over any money it receives.
Between these two extremes are two partial conduits, each of which
raises somewhat different issues. The first partial conduit defines its own
purposes but does not control part of the money it receives. Such a partial
conduit functions as a conduit with respect to particular transactions, and
as an independent organization with respect to other transactions. 194 Its
conduit operations are identified through tracing funds.
The other type of partial conduit raises or controls its own funds but
uses them for the purposes and at the direction of another organization.
In this case, tracing funds does not reveal the conduit nature of its
operation with respect to any specific transaction. Here, the conduit
nature of the organization rests on the absence of an independent purpose
within the meaning of Moline Properties.195 Political conduits of this type
are commonly established by core supporters and current or former staff
191. For a recent example, see the conduit financing regulations of Treas. Reg. §
1.881-3 (1996).
192. This analysis applies, for example, in determining whether a contribution to a
United States organization qualifies for a charitable contribution deduction when the
purpose of the United States organization is to support the activities of a foreign
organization. A contribution made directly to a foreign organization does not qualify for
a charitable contribution deduction under I.R.C. § 170. In this area, form may be given
greater deference than it is in certain other areas of tax law. Rev. Rul. 63-252, 1963-2
C.B. 101, amplified Rev. Rul. 66-79 1966-1 C.B. 48.
193. See, e.g., Moline Properties, 319 U.S. at 436; National Carbide Corp. v.
Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
194. Aspects of this relationship are found in grants made from one exempt
organization to one or more other exempt organizations. For a discussion of planning
techniques in this area, see GREGORY L. COLVIN, FIscAL SPONSORSHIP: 6 WAYS To Do
IT RIGHT (1993).
195. Moline Properties, 319 U.S. at 436.
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members of the candidate. The organization appears to have an
independent board of directors, but the activities of the apparently
independent board are so closely coordinated with the candidate's political
agenda that the candidate exercises operational control over the
organization, and the organization functions as a mere agent of the
candidate.196
While this typology serves the analytical purpose of highlighting
elements of a conduit relationship, in practice, types of conduits are rarely
so clearly delineated. Elements of the ideal typical conduits appear, to
varying degree, inmost political conduits. Political conduits work because
Buckley held that only contributions could be limited, and that only the
amount in fact controlled by candidates constituted contributions, in
contrast to independent expenditures. Conduits help obscure the control
exercised by candidates and the pattern of coordination with candidates
even when the candidate exercises control over the operations of the
conduit. Thus, by using one or more conduits, a candidate can transform
contributions into independent expenditures and, at the same time, defeat
disclosure by obscuring the identity of the true contributors. The ability
of candidates to operate multiple committees also contributes to this result
and makes tracing funds more problematic. One of the current
unanswered questions is whether or to what extent corporate soft money
contributions are moved through various conduits to fund purported
independent expenditures that are in substance contributions subject to
limitation and disclosure.
B. Exempt Organizations as Corporate-Candidate Conduits:
Legal Bases and Special Benefits
At first glance, exempt organizations are unlikely conduits. I.R.C §
501(c)(3) absolutely prohibits support for, or opposition to, any candidate
for public office. 197 No other forms of exempt organizations set forth in
§ 501(c) treat electoral politics as an exempt purpose. Indeed, § 527 sets
forth distinct grounds for not taxing the income of political
organizations,' g and requires that § 501(c) organizations that become
involved in those activities are treated as political within the meaning of
196. See National Carbide Corp., 336 U.S. at 422 (setting forth this agency rationale
for disregarding an entity); see also HILL & KIRSCHTEN, supra note 4, 9.01.
197. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1986) (providing that an organization qualifies for
exemption only if it "does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or
distributing of statements) any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any
candidate for public office").
198. See id. § 527.
[Vol. 41
1997] CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE 923
§ 527 also comply with these rules. 99 Yet, exempt organizations can be
important components in the complex structures that characterize
contemporary political campaigns. Paradoxically, this development in
campaign finance arises in part because of the tax law prohibitions and
limitations on political activity.
Exempt organizations offer three potential benefits as corporate-
candidate conduits: the absence of an entity-level tax; the opportunity to
recharacterize political activities as exempt activities; and, in the case of
§ 501(c)(3) organizations, a potential tax deduction for political
contributions. Each of these is discussed below.
1. Absence of an Entity-Level Tax
The absence of an entity-level tax is a fundamental benefit in making
any type of an exempt organization a more attractive conduit than other
taxable entities or individuals. If the essence of a pure conduit is that
earmarked money simply flows through it, then imposing a tax on the
transfer from the contributor to the conduit reduces the economic
efficiency of the transaction. The tax becomes a cost of doing political
business. If, however, tax can be legally avoided, the pure conduit
functions as intended by both the contributor and the recipient candidate.
Any of the organizations described in § 501(c) will provide this benefit
since all of these organizations are exempt from the entity-level tax."'
Thus, even multi-conduit arrangements impose no tax cost if each of the
organizations is exempt from tax.
If tax were the sole consideration, however, then a political committee
described in § 527 would be equally attractive because it, too, is free of
entity-level tax. Indeed, a § 527 political committee might be even more
attractive since this tax benefit applies expressly to political contributions
and political expenditures. However, a § 501(c) exempt organization
conduit offers the additional benefit of permitting the recharacterization of
political activities as exempt activities.
2. Recharacterizing Political Activities as Exempt Activities: Overview
Several types of exempt organizations can serve as corporate-candidate
conduits. In each case, the benefit is that the presence of an exempt
conduit can be used to argue that political activities are in fact exempt
199. See id; see also Cerny & Hill, supra note 10.
200. See I.R.C. § 501. The exception is the taxation of unrelated business income,
which does not encompass the conduit transactions of campaign finance. See id. § 501(b).
The unrelated business income tax is set forth in I.R.C. §§ 510-514. For an analysis of
the unrelated business income tax, see HILL & KIRSCHTEN, supra note 4, at 10-13.
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activities. The effect of this recharacterization is that the reporting and
disclosure requirements of federal election law, as well as the limitations
on the source and amount of contributions, simply do not apply.
Corporations can make what are in substance unlimited contributions to the
campaigns of selected candidates and, by the same token, candidates can
demand virtually unlimited contributions from contributors otherwise
protected by the limits imposed under election law. Through the use of
exempt conduits, election law is not simply crippled, it is rendered
inapplicable.
This recharacterization is less complete when organizations other than
§ 501(c)(3) organizations are involved. In these cases, the organization
has the option of making the argument that it, not the corporate
contributor, is engaged in political activity, thereby recharacterizing only
the parties to the political contribution transaction. Even these
organizations, however, generally advance arguments not only that they
are acting on their own behalf but also that their activities are exempt
activities and not political activities. This dual recharacterization is
necessary to protect the candidate from the intended effect of federal
election law. If an organization simply argues that it and not the true
contributor is engaged in electoral politics, then it must register with the
FEC and disclose its contributions or independent expenditures. The
amount of the contribution is limited. In presidential elections, the amount
is counted against the candidate's expenditure limitation. For federal
income tax purposes, the organization must report its political expenditure
income to the IRS even though it is taxed only on any amount of political
income that is used to earn investment income.' If, however, an exempt
organization argues that the activity is not political activity but exempt
activity, then it has taken the transaction entirely out of the scope of
election law.
Other than § 501(c)(3) organizations, which are discussed below, the
most common exempt conduits are § 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations
and § 501(c)(6) trade associations. Social welfare organizations generally
engage in civic betterment activities. They are sometimes treated as being
able to engage in any activity that a § 501(c)(3) organization may engage
in, but without the same political prohibition or the same limitation on
lobbying. Organizations that have lost their § 501(c)(3) status due to
political activity cannot simply apply for exemption under § 501(c)(4). °2
Political activities cannot be the primary activity of a § 501(c)(4)
organization. °3 The same type of activities will be treated as political
201. See I.R.C. § 527; see also Cemy & Hill, supra note 10 (noting that political
income is reported on Form 1120-POL).
202. See I.R.C. § 504.
203. See Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332.
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activities for both § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) organizations. 2° Certain
organizations that have been very active in issue advocacy are organized
under § 501(c)(4). °5 Prominent examples include the National Rifle
Association and the Sierra Club.2 6 The Sierra Club developed innovative
televised voter guides that pushed the boundaries of both tax law and
election law by contrasting the environmental records of named candidates
but stopping short of urging that viewers vote for the candidate with the
approved record.207 Perhaps the best known of these groups is the
Christian Coalition, which has applied for exemption from tax as a §
501(c)(4) organization but has not yet received a determination from the
IRS. While its application for exemption is pending, the Christian
Coalition is protected from disclosing its contributors. In July 1996, the
FEC filed suit against the Christian Coalition for allegedly operating in
coordination with the Republican Party. 2 8
A prominent recent example of the use of a § 501(c)(4) organization
was the Better America Foundation ("BAF"), which was created by
Senator Robert Dole. 20 9 Typical of corporate-candidate conduits, BAF was
established by long time staffers of Senator Dole, not by the Senator
directly. 210 This arrangement gives the candidate the reality of control
without the risk that direct control would turn contributions to the conduit
into political contributions within the meaning of the FECA and
Buckley .21 BAF's articles of incorporation stated that it was organized
"'[tlo promote and advocate values and principles espoused by the
Republican party and to urge consideration of such principles for a better
204. See id.
205. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(4). Many of these organizations are complex structures that
include an affiliated organization that can receive deductible charitable contributions. See
id. § 501(c)(3).
206. See, e.g., Janet Hook, Special Interests Rewriting Political Script, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 24, 1996, at A21; Ruth Marcus, Outside Groups Pushing Election Laws into
Irrelevance, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1996, at A9.
207. See David S. Broder, et al., Voter Guides on the Small Screen, WASH. POST,
July 21, 1996, at A22.
208. See Ruth Marcus, FEC Files Suit Over Christian Coalition Role; Work with
Republicans in Campaign Alleged, WASH. POST, July 31, 1996, at Al.
209. See Timothy J. Burger & Glenn R. Simpson, Dole's New Secret Weapon,
ROLL CALL, Nov. 7, 1994, at Al.
210. See id. The executive director was Senator Dole's deputy chief of staff and the
president was the executive director of his PAC, Campaign America. See id. at A21.
Dole held the position of "honorary Chairman." Id.
211. See supra Part II.B.1.
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America.' 212 BAF touted its benefits as a conduit for political money,
telling potential contributors that there were no limits on the amounts an
individual or corporation may contribute and that there was no requirement
for public disclosure of contributors.1 3 In 1994, BAF raised $4 million
from corporations and wealthy individuals and spent $1.2 million on a
television advertisement featuring Senator Dole.21 4 The thirty second spot
began to run on CNN on October 31, 1994, within a week of the 1994
mid-term elections.215 Against a backdrop of patriotic images, a narrator
stated: "'[t]hat's why the Better America Foundation was formed-to help
leaders like Bob Dole and Newt Gingrich fight for a balanced budget, less
spending and lower taxes. A plan for a better America. ',216 The final
line of the ad urged viewers to "call, and help turn Congress around."
21 7
BAF was so successful that it became publicly controversial, thereby
imposing political costs on Senator Dole's presidential aspirations. In
response to this adverse publicity, Senator Dole returned the contributions
to the contributors and dissolved the organization.2 8
Section 501(c)(6) organizations include chambers of commerce and
trade associations which promote the interests of a line of business rather
than the particular interests of the individual members. 2 9 There is no
precedential guidance on the treatment of political activities for tax
purposesy 0
212. CHARLES LEWIS, THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, THE BUYING OF THE
PRESIDENT 115 (1996).
213. See id. at 115-16.
214. See Jake Thompson, Ads Seek Support for GOP, Ideas, KAN. CITY STAR, Nov.
8, 1994, at Al (reporting that the 30-second advertisement cost over one million dollars).
For a list of contributors to BAF see LEWIS, supra note 212, at 116-17.
215. See Thompson, supra note 214.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See R.H. Melton, Dole's Tax-Exempt Group Plans to Refund Millions; List
Shows Backers of Closing Foundation, WASH. POST, June 21, 1995, at Al (describing
the contributors as "a virtual Who's Who of corporate America"); see also James
Kuhnhenn, Dole Group Offered Donors a 'Loophole'; BetterA merica's Contributor's Got
Senator's Help on Bills, KAN. CITY STAR, June 22, 1995, at Al.
219. See HILL & KIRSCHTEN, supra note 4, at ch. 7 (analyzing I.R.C. § 501(c)(6)
organizations).
220. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,233 (Dec. 30, 1969). The Service, in
nonprecedential guidance from almost thirty years ago, contrasted legislative lobbying,
which might be related to the members' common business interests, with political
activities, which would not be related to members' common business interests since the
organization had to support or reject all of the positions taken by a candidate and not just
those positions related to the members' common business interests. See id.
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Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which involved a §
501(c)(6) chamber of commerce, could be read in support of the
proposition that courts will apply election law by looking through an
intermediary organized as a corporation to the members organized as
corporations." This might in practice apply primarily to § 501(c)(6)
organizations since they are more likely to have members who pay dues
(in contrast to supporters who make contributions but exercise no role in
organizational governance). It is not clear that the Court in Austin
intended the case to be read this broadly or that a future court might do so
even with substantially similar facts of a trade association organized as a
corporation and having corporate members.
The San Diego Convention and Visitors Bureau, a § 501(c)(6)
organization, found itself in the middle of a controversy during the 1996
Republican National Convention when it initially agreed to serve as a
conduit for a corporate contributor, the Amway Corporation, which agreed
to contribute $1.3 million to buy air time for gavel-to-gavel coverage of
the convention on Pat Robertson's Family Channel on cable television. 2
The San Diego Convention and Visitors Bureau claimed that it was merely
promoting tourism to San Diego by accepting money for and then paying
for the cable coverage of the Republican Convention.2' The organization
was unwilling to extend this rationale when it was asked to serve as a
conduit to pay for air time for an additional program produced directly by
the Republican Party. 4
3. Deduction and Recharacterization: Section 501(c)(3) Organizations as
Conduits
Paradoxically, the most likely conduit, and the one offering the
greatest benefits, is a § 501(c)(3) organization that is absolutely prohibited
from supporting or opposing candidates for public office. Because §
221. See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990).
It is unclear whether the Court was looking through the trade association to its members,
which were for-profit, taxable corporations. See id. Cf. Federal Election Comm'n v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (providing an example of the Court
treating as one of the organization's three distinguishing features the absence of corporate
or union members and finding that the organization was not serving as a conduit).
222. See Ruth Marcus, Amway Says it was Unnamed Donor to Help Broadcast GOP
Convention; Democrats to File ComplaintAlleging Illegal Corporate Contribution, WASH.
POST, July 26, 1996, at A8; Ruth Marcus, RNCAsked, Amway Gave; Firm's Chief Says
Barbour Sought San Diego TV Funds, WASH. POST, July 27, 1996, at A12.
223. See Gerry Braun, The Republican Convention; ConVis is Out as Conduit for
GOP TV Funds, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 9, 1996, at BI.
224. See id.
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501(c)(3) contains the absolute prohibition, § 501(c)(3) organizations are
not subject to the tax reporting requirements imposed on other § 501(c)
organizations by § 527 and they are not required to register with and
report to the FEC.
Charitable conduits are based on recharacterizing political activity as
exempt educational activity. The relationship between educational and
political activity is widely misunderstood. The key to understanding the
relationship between educational activity and political activity is to
understand that an activity can be simultaneously educational and
political.' Determining that an activity qualifies as education within the
meaning of § 501(c)(3) does not mean that the activity is not also a
prohibited political activity. Simultaneous characterization of an activity
as both educational and political follows logically from the different
criteria used to determine whether an activity is educational or political.
For purposes of § 501(c)(3), an activity is educational if it conveys
sufficient information to permit the listener to make her own
determination.2 6 Thus, an organization that takes controversial positions
on contested public issues may qualify for exemption as an educational
organization if it presents information that facilitates the listeners' own
learning processes.
The determination of whether an activity constitutes impermissible
political activity is based on the intent or purposes of those engaged in the
activity, not on an analysis of any inherent qualities of the activity. Intent
is deciphered from the statements of the participants or from an analysis
of the manner in which the activity is conducted2 7
The distinction between the methodology test and the purpose test is
fundamental to understanding the role of § 501(c)(3) organizations as
corporate-candidate conduits. If essentialist criteria were used to
determine whether an activity is impermissible political activity within the
meaning of § 501(c)(3), all political activity could claim to be educational.
Most political advertisements convey information. If this alone precluded
225. See HILL & KIRSCHTEN, supra note 4, 2.03[4][b][ii].
226. See Rev. Proc. 86-43, 1986-2 C.B. 729 (setting forth a four-part methodology
test to determine whether an activity is educational). This methodology test was
developed in response to an appellate court determination that the "full and fair
exposition" test of Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3) was unconstitutionally vague. See
Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. Commissioner, 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also
Nationalist Movement v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 4785, 4797 (1992) (upholding the IRS'
methodology test). For an analysis of the basis of determining what activities constitute
exempt educational activities, see HILL & KIRSCHTEN, supra note 4, 1 2.03[4][b].
227. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1986); see also HILL & KIRSCHTEN, supra note 4,
2.03(4)(d) (discussing the analyses considered when determining whether activities such
as voter registration drives, voter guides, or candidate fora are permissible educational
activities or impermissible political activities under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)).
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characterization of the advertisement as political, all politics would be
education and all political contributions would be deductible charitable
contributions.
Consider the following example. If a candidate hired an actor to read
the Federalist Papers in their entirety during prime television viewing
hours on all the major television networks and all the cable outlets
simultaneously, the activity might be educational, but it might also be
political. An argument can be made that hearing the Federalist Papers
read would be an educational experience. But that is neither the end nor
the core of the inquiry. The core of the inquiry is whether the activity
was undertaken for the purpose of affecting the election or defeat of one
or more candidates for public office. The determination of whether this
is a political activity would rest on the candidate's purpose in presenting
the Federalist Papers. Even if the candidate stated that she had done this
only to educate the viewers, it would be necessary to consider whether and
in what manner the candidate identified herself with the program. Did she
herself participate in reading the Federalist Papers to the viewers? When
was the next election? Had the campaign involved a dispute over the
Federalist Papers so that reading them would be understood in the context
of the campaign debate?
Or, consider Ross Perot, who was a declared candidate for President
of the United States on the Reform Party ticket. Perot campaigned
primarily through a series of paid television appearances of approximately
thirty minutes each, during which he presented significant amounts of
information assisted by numerous charts and graphs. These appearances
are not vulnerable to the charge leveled against the thirty second "spot"
advertisements, the staple of most campaigns, that they convey no
information. Does this distinction mean that Perot was engaged in
education and that other candidates were engaged in politics? Answering
in the affirmative would require that essentialist criteria were the only
grounds for analysis and characterization.
Another contemporary example centers on the now famous Newt
Gingrich lectures on Renewing American Civilization. z 8 While a member
of the House of Representatives, but before becoming Speaker of the
House, Gingrich offered a series of lectures on Renewing American
Civilization, first at Kennesaw State College and then at Reinhardt
College.2 9 The course, as offered at the host college, was team-taught by
Gingrich and a local faculty member, each of whom gave half of the
lectures. Those lectures presented by Gingrich, but not those offered by
the local faculty member, were offered for credit at numerous colleges
228. See Frances R. Hill, Newt Gingrich and Oliver Twist: Charitable Contributions
and Campaign Finance, 66 TAX NOTES 237, 11 EXEMPT ORGS. TAX REV. 43 (1995);
229. See id. at 245.
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around the country through a satellite distribution via National
Empowerment TV, which supports conservative political causes.
The course, particularly the dissemination of the Gingrich lectures,
was funded through contributions directed to the Abraham Lincoln
Opportunity Fund, a dormant § 501(c)(3) organization revived for this
purpose by Gingrich loyalists. Contributions were solicited by GOPAC
or Gingrich employees from persons, individual or corporate, who had
previously contributed to Gingrich or GOPAC. Persons who contributed
to the Abraham Lincoln Opportunity Fund were given memberships in
GOPAC.
Representative Gingrich has consistently responded to charges that the
course was a political activity with essentialist arguments that the course
was a purely educational activity. Pointing to his having earned a
doctorate in American history and his prior career as a faculty member,
Gingrich argued that the course was purely educational and that it could
not be treated as political if, on essentialist grounds, it is educational.
The House of Representatives voted to reprimand Gingrich and to levy
a $300,000 payment to the House because it determined that "Mr.
Gingrich engaged in conduct that did not reflect creditably on the House
of Representatives. "23 The House left the question of Gingrich's violation
of tax law to the Internal Revenue Service.
Gingrich is not the only member of Congress to appreciate the
potential benefits of adding a § 501(c)(3) organization to his fund-raising
apparatus. The bipartisan enthusiasm for charitable conduits rests
ultimately on the argument that educational activities cannot also be
political activities. By having a charity organized by loyalists but not by
the candidate himself, the Buckley control criterion for contributions is
satisfied and the charities' activities elude reporting to the FEC. If the
conduit loses its exempt status, the candidate's loyalists simply organize
another organization, apply for exemption, and conduct business as usual.
4. Complex Conduits
Candidates who are more circumspect than Gingrich organize a
complex conduit built on two or more exempt organizations. 23' In this
case, the corporate contributor transfers money to an IRC § 501(c)(3)
organization that claims to be engaged in educational activities. This
230. See U.S. House of Representatives, Statement of the Investigative
Subcommittee on Behalf of the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct,
December 21, 1996, available in LEXIS 96 TNT 249-25, 52 (Dec. 24, 1996)
(documenting Gingrich's admission of violations).
231. See HILL & KIRSCHTEN, supra note 4, 9.09 (analyzing complex structures of
exempt organizations).
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organization retains some of the money and uses the rest for a contribution
to an IRC § 501(c)(4) organization. Section 501(c)(6) trade associations
use the same structure so their contributors can claim a charitable
contribution deduction for their contributions to a § 501(c)(3) organization
affiliated with the trade association. The § 501(c)(4) or § 501(c)(6)
organization can either contribute directly to a candidate or it can create
an IRC § 527(f)(3) separate segregated fund that contributes directly to a
candidate.
This structure is based on respect for the separate identity of each
component organization in a complex structure of affiliated
organizations." 2 It was mentioned in passing in Justice Blackmun's
concurrence in Taxation with Representation, a case that dealt with
lobbying, not prohibited political activity, by a § 501(c)(3) organization.3 3
Justice Blackmun, however, took the position that the money contributed
to the § 501(c)(3) organization could not be used for lobbying.u 4 Barriers
to moving deductible contributions out of the § 501(c)(3) organization and
into the § 501(c)(4) organization or the § 501(c)(6) organization may limit
the effectiveness of complex structures. One method commonly used is
for the § 501(c)(4) or § 501(c)(6) organization to provide space, office
equipment, and other services to the § 501(c)(3) organization at prices that
provide a surplus that can be used for hard money contributions to a
candidate2 35 Another method of transferring funds is to assert that the
affiliated organization is not engaging in politics but in activities that the
§ 501(c)(3) organization could itself undertake. This strategy requires that
the organizations develop some rationale for making the transfer.
Senator Jesse Helms operated a paradigmatic complex conduit called
the Coalition for Freedom. 6 Once the IRS revoked the Coalition's
exempt status, Senator Helms announced that he had severed all ties with
the organization 37 Like all conduits, the Coalition for Freedom was
disposable and replaceable.
232. See supra Part IV.A.
233. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 551-54 (1983)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
234. See id. at 552-53.
235. See I.R.C. § 482 (1986) (addressing these questions of cost).
236. See Paul Taylor, Helms Modernizes GOP Political Machine for the Electronic
Age, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1982, at A2.
237. See Toni Locy, Helms Breaks with Coalition Called a Cash Conduit by IRS,
WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 1994, at A8.
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5. Reverse and Lateral Conduits
The standard conduit transaction involves a transfer to one or more
conduits with a candidate committee or political party as the final
destination. Yet, conduits, particularly exempt conduits, offer benefits
through reverse or lateral conduit transactions as well. A reverse conduit
arrangement involves a transfer from a candidate committee or a political
party to an exempt organization. A lateral conduit arrangement is a
transfer from one exempt organization to another.
Reverse conduit arrangements serve to permit political parties and
other political committees to evade the contribution limitations. Lateral
conduit arrangements may also serve this purpose if the transferor is an
exempt organization that is also a political organization and has reached its
contribution limitation for a particular election.
Both reverse and lateral conduit arrangements serve to mask the
identity of the supporter of a policy position. A political party may
transfer funds to an exempt organization that shares its views on an issue
so that the issue appears to have public support outside the party, thereby
enhancing the public perception of the issue as legitimate in its own terms
and not simply a partisan position. Similarly, an exempt organization may
feel that its position on one controversial issue may limit its effectiveness
in promoting another controversial idea. It may thus transfer funds to
another organization that can, presumably, more effectively promote a
policy or a candidate identified with a policy. Recent elections illustrate
both of these transactions.
The Republican Party 8 completed at least three reverse conduit
transactions. One involved a transfer of $175,000 from the National
Republican Senatorial Committee to an antiabortion group, the National
Right to Life Committee, in the closing days of the 1994 election.2 9
Senator Phil Gramm, then Chair of the National Republican Senatorial
Committee, initially said "I made a decision. . . to provide some money
to help activate pro-life voters in some key states where they would be
pivotal to the election."240 The same day he revised his explanation to
state that he had transferred the money because the anti-abortion group's
"message conformed to the Republican message." 24' The organization in
question claimed that it used the funds for "our ongoing educational,
legislative citizen awareness activities" and denied any involvement in
238. Neither major party is one cohesive organization. Both have numerous
committees that raise and distribute funds.
239. See Ruth Marcus, GOP Donation Aided Right to Life Group; Money Was Not
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election campaigns.242 The organization explained that its PAC's
expenditure of $107,000 on behalf of Republican Senate candidates was a
coincidence.243
The National Republican Senatorial Committee has been accused of
transferring soft money from corporate contributors to exempt
organizations in Georgia which then used the money to support the
Republic candidate, Paul Coverdell, who eventually won the runoff
election. 2 4  In this case, too, the transfer was allegedly used by the
organizations for voter mobilization efforts that were at the margins of the
permissible.
A third example of a reverse conduit arrangement arose in the 1996
presidential election when the Republican National Committee transferred
$4.6 million to Americans for Tax Reform; a group that is severely critical
of the federal income tax and of the Internal Revenue Service, in the
month before the 1996 election. 245 In this case, the recipient organization
reinforced the Republican Party's anti-tax, anti-government message,
including the specific tax proposals of Bob Dole, the Republican candidate
for President. Again, the organization stated that it was simply pursuing
the issue agenda it had always pursued and that it was not engaging in
impermissible intervention in a political campaign.
24 6
Reverse conduits may offer a means of using soft money to affect the
outcome of a specific election. An exempt organization will be able to
engage in voter mobilization efforts and to argue that they have not
engaged in political activities. This may explain a contribution of
$117,500 from the Democratic National Committee to the National
Coalition on Black Voter Participation, which aimed to increase electoral
participation by African American voters.247
Because the definition of party-building which can be funded by soft
money, including unlimited corporate contributions, is imprecise,248 and
because the boundaries of the permissible voter education activities is also




245. See Charles R. Babcock, A nti-Tax Group Got Big Boost From RNC as Election
Neared, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 1996, at A4.
246. See id. See also supra Part IV.B.3 (discussing tax reform groups operating as
§ 501(c)(3) organizations that cannot support or oppose candidates for public office).
247. See Michael Isikoff, The White House Shell Game; How the Clinton
Campaign's Frantic Fund Raising May Have Crossed the Line, NEWsWEEK, Feb. 10,
1997, at 34.
248. See supra Part l.B.3 for a discussion on soft money and party-building.
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law, the potential to direct soft money, including corporate contributions,
to specific campaigns. This possibility will continue as long as the
Supreme Court precludes inquiry into whether politicians benefit from
expenditures and limit inquiry to whether they control funds.2 49
Another example of a reverse conduit arises at the end of a political
career when a politician retires or is retired. Long-time incumbents may
have retained, quite legally, excess campaign funds since the ability to
raise political money increases as the seriousness of challenges in the home
district declines. This phenomenon supports the interpretation of campaign
contributions as access fees for legislative influence on a particular issue
more than a general commitment to the election of a particular candidate.
At the end of a political career, the politician may not retain the political
funds unless she pays tax on this amount. However, the politician may
donate such sums to an IRC § 501(c)(3) organization. This public charity
may be one that the politician herself has created and which will employ
her after her public career has ended. Provided that the new charity
functions in accordance with IRC § 501(c)(3), the former politician may
draw a reasonable salary, based in part on the politician's prior salary.
This is, of course, an ambiguous situation. It may result in significant
public benefits to a charitable class. It may result most directly in
supporting the politician's continued ability to speak on public issues,
perhaps with an eye to returning to elective office.
Lateral conduits involve transfers from one exempt organization to
another exempt organization. These cases are only beginning to come to
light in the wake of the 1996 campaign. While the direct conduit
relationship within a complex conduit is to place money in a § 501(c)(3)
for the purpose of offering political contributors a charitable contribution
deduction, lateral conduit arrangements are more likely to be undertaken
between organizations that have no formal affiliation. In these lateral
conduit relationships, a § 501(c)(3) organization may well be the recipient
organization. The purpose of a lateral conduit arrangement is to reinforce
a campaign message by having it issue from a group with the presumption
of integrity and political even-handedness that follows from exempt
status.
249. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of these issues in the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence regarding political money.
250. See supra Part IV.B.4 for a discussion of complex conduits.
251. See infra Part V.D. for a discussion of the danger of erosion of public
confidence in precisely these traits of exempt organizations.
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V. WHY CONDUITS MATTER
Understanding why and how conduits are used is a prelude to thinking
about why and how conduits matter-apart from any impact that particular
conduits may have on the outcome of particular elections. The rationales
discussed above for concern about corporate contributions provide one set
of reasons that conduits matter since conduits permit political contributors,
including corporate contributors, to evade the statutory terms of their
political contributions. In addition to these concerns about corruption and
the appearance of corruption, the effect of concentrated wealth, and
protection against compelled contributions from shareholders and
employees, this article suggests that the role of conduits in campaign
finance raises broader systemic issues. Each of these concerns involves
contested propositions, but each also raises aspects of the ongoing effort
to understand the core values of American democracy. These four
concerns are set forth here not as settled propositions but as areas for
discussion. This article identifies the following four areas in which
conduits matter: (1) shaping the nature and quality of public discourse; (2)
externalizing the costs of political contributions; (3) undermining tax
equity; and (4) undermining public confidence in exempt organizations.
Each of these is discussed below.
A. Conduits and Public Discourse
Conduits mask, or are intended to mask, the identity of one party or
both parties to a political contribution transaction. Such masking raises
questions about the quality of political discourse. This is inconsistent with
the reporting and disclosure requirements of election law. 25 2 The Supreme
Court has based its jurisprudence of political money on the right of
persons to speak and the right of the public to hear.2 3 It has been less
certain that the public has a right to know who is speaking. If a campaign
contribution is protected political speech, then the use of conduits can be
brought within the existing jurisprudence only if the identity of the speaker
is irrelevant to the right of the listener. This approach to political speech
would in fact mean that speakers have greater rights than listeners to
structure the terms of public discourse. Because listening is passive, with
the only defense under this approach being a refusal to listen, the quality
of political discourse is diminished for the listener to the advantage of the
speaker-contributor. Political speech jurisprudence that discourages
listening or that is consistent only with passive listening is not
jurisprudence that values political speech as deliberative democracy.
252. See supra Part II.B.5.
253. See supra Part II.A.
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Under this approach political speech becomes a competitive zero-sum right
in which a speaker's right is a listener's loss of a right. Such
jurisprudence of political speech is destructive of the idea of political
speech as the bedrock of citizen sovereignty and the means by which
citizens constitute their government.
Inquiry into the identity of the speaker is readily distinguishable from
a constitutionally impermissible inquiry into the content of the speech.
Those who hear political speech do not simply have a passive right to be
targets of speech taken at face value, but have an active right to make
judgment about that speech, based on full information as to its source and
the manner in which it was developed. Information about the source of
speech may well, for many listeners, be an important factor in making
such judgments. The speaker's active right cannot be premised on
according the listener only a passive right. Political speech rights can be
politically constitutive only if they are interactive, only if speakers and
listeners both have active rights. Constitutionally protected political
speech is not asymmetric and listeners are not passive, captive targets of
speech about which they cannot inquire.
The Supreme Court's 1995 decision in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission replicated this debate without resolving it." This case
involved an Ohio statute that prohibited the distribution of campaign
literature that does not identify the person or organization distributing it. 5
Mrs. McIntyre, with the help of her son and a friend, printed handbills on
her home computer calling for the defeat of a referendum on tax increases
to support education. The handbills were addressed to "'concerned parents
and tax payers.'"256 In upholding Mrs. McIntyre's right to circulate her
handbill without identifying herself as the author, the Court rejected the
public's right to know who is speaking to them. Citing John Stuart Mill,
the Court held that "anonymous pamphletering" protected unpopular
persons from having their speech rejected. 7 The Court found that this
interest outweighed any interest listeners may have in knowing who is
254. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
255. See id. at 338 n.3.
256. Id. at 337.
257. See id. at 357.
Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious,
fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and dissent.
Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority .... It thus exemplifies
the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment in
particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation-and their ideas
from suppression-at the hand of an intolerant society.
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speaking.5 8 Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, filed a
vigorous dissent5 9 The dissent distinguished anonymous publication in
general from "anonymous electioneering." 20  Permitting anonymous
electioneering "facilitates wrong by eliminating accountability. "261 While
recognizing that some situations that pose a danger of reprisals might
require exceptions to a general prohibition on anonymous electioneering,262
the dissent concluded that no such danger existed in this case or was likely
to occur in most cases in contemporary America.263 The dissent also noted
that the disclosure requirements upheld in Buckley were more intrusive
than were those in the Ohio statute requiring identification of the
speaker.2 4
Questions of the scope of McIntyre were presented in the two
concurring opinions. Justice Ginsburg suggested that other cases might be
decided differently. 265 As she observed without elaboration, "[w]e do not
thereby hold that the State may not in other, larger circumstances, require
the speaker to disclose its interest by disclosing its identity."266 Justice
Thomas, in a rare deviation from the positions of Justice Scalia, concurred
in the result but would have found the Ohio statute facially
unconstitutional.267
Whatever the subsequent interpretation of McIntyre, the anonymous
pamphleteering in the context of a referendum might be distinguishable
from the pseudonymous speech represented by conduits, whether in
referenda or in elections for public office.268 Pseudonymous speech
represents an attempt not simply to mask the identity of the speaker, but
to recharacterize the speaker. In the case of a corporate-candidate conduit,
the conduit's status as an exempt organization becomes part of the message
and is an integral part of the recharacterization. Use of an exempt
organization is an attempt to assert the legitimacy of the message by
258. See id. at 347-48.
259. See id. at 371 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
260. Id. at 372-73.
261. Id. at 385.
262. See id.
263. See id. at 380.
264. See id. at 383.
265. See id. at 358 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
266. Id.
267. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
268. See generally Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce 494 U.S. 652 (1989);
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (exemplifying the distinction
between referenda and elections).
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presenting it as the view of supposedly neutral third parties acting in the
public interest.
This is the issue raised in Philip Morris's creation of an exempt
conduit to release a study of campaign contributions by the trial lawyers
with whom the tobacco companies are locked in a battle over the health
costs of smoking. 269 During the 1996 campaign, Philip Morris directed
State Affairs, Inc., a lobbying and public relations firm doing
approximately half of its business with the tobacco giant, to establish a §
501(c)(4) organization. Working with Philip Morris's law firm, Covington
and Burling of Washington, D.C., State Affairs created "Contributions
Watch." Because Contributions Watch was intended to apply to exemption
as an organization described in IRC § 501(c)(4), contributions would not
be deductible but neither would it be required to disclose its contributors.
By having State Affairs create the exempt organization, Philip Morris
completely masked its role. Shortly after its creation, Contributions Watch
issued a detailed study of the campaign contributions of the trial lawyers.
The trial lawyers spent heavily on legislative lobbying to defeat tort reform
legislation that would have limited recoveries against tobacco companies,
among others. 270 Trial lawyers have also been significant contributors to
state and federal candidates. 27' When it released this study to the public,
Contributions Watch presented itself as an independent organization, not
as an organization fully funded by Philip Morris. When the press made
public the connection between Contributions Watch and Philip Morris,
State Affairs admitted that it would have been better to reveal from the
beginning Philip Morris's role in the organization's creation.27
This kind of recharacterization of the identity of speakers contributes
to a corrosive cynicism about public discourse that undermines the
constitutive role of such discourse in political life. It undermines both the
listeners' right to hear and the role of free speech in preserving and
shaping a democratic system.
269. See Ruth Marcus, Tobacco Lobby Created Campaign 'Watchdog', Nonprofit
Group Tied to Philip Morris Monitored Trial Lawyer Donations, VASH. POST, Sept. 30,
1996, at Al.
270. See Douglas Frantz, Trial Lawyers, Their Money and Their Influence Have
Become Issues in the Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1996, at 18.
271. See id.
272. See Glenn R. Simpson, Philip Morris Backs Study of Lawyers' Campaign
Outlays, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 1996, at B6 (quoting a State Affairs, Inc. statement as
saying that "more specific disclosure of this funding would have been the better, and the
right, course").
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B. Externalizing the Cost of Political Activities
Federal election law is based on attributing contributions and
expenditures to identifiable persons.273 Tax law is based on financing
political activities with after-tax money. 274 Taken together, election law
and tax law evidence the intent that the costs of political activities be borne
by those who initiate them and that such costs not be spread via tax
deductions to other taxpayers.
Permitting the recharacterization of political contributions as deductible
charitable contributions amounts to a taxpayer subsidy of the political
activity. For this reason, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in
the Bush Administration, Michael Graetz, called upon Newt Gingrich to
reimburse the Treasury, with interest, for the improper deductions claimed
by his political contributors.275 Graetz based his reasoning on the effect
on the deficit, pointing out that such deductions increase the government's
need to borrow.27 6
Externalizing costs of political campaigns to taxpayers raises another
issue as well. In effect, permitting questionable charitable contribution
deductions is equivalent to compelling shareholders or employees to
contribute to particular candidates277 or to using union dues to support
candidates who the rank and file do not wish to support, 278 both of which
are prohibited by current law. 279 Use of exempt conduits creates a captive
taxpayer problem.
If politicians are permitted to compel contributions by using exempt
conduits, constitutionally protected speech means that listeners are required
to subsidize messages they do not wish to hear and would not choose to
send. Opponents of public funding of campaigns argue in part that citizens
should not be forced to support candidates with whom they disagree.
Direct public funding, whatever the merits of the overall approach, at least
would fund all viable candidates. Indirect public funding through exempt
273. See supra Part II.
274. See supra Part III.
275. See Michael J. Graetz, What Gingrich Owes Us, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1997,
at A15.
276. See id.
277. See, e.g., Ruth Marcus & Charles R. Babcock, The Business of 'Bundling',
VASH. POST, Apr. 25, 1996, at Al (noting that compelled contributions by employees
are "bundled" to increase their impact and their identification with the employer).
278. See supra Part I.C for a discussion of the captive member problem.
279. See supra Part II.B.4 (noting that both corporations and unions are prohibited
from using treasury funds to fund the political contributions made by their affiliated
PACs).
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conduits is highly selective and perversely rewards those candidates most
willing to skirt the law. z"'
C. Tax Fairness and Exempt Conduits
The compelled political contributions described above are a type of tax
expenditure. 2"' There is, however, one important difference highlighted
by the moral hazard problem raised above. While the classic tax
expenditure is an alternative to a permissible federal government program,
the political tax expenditure at issue here arises from recharacterizing a
political contribution as a charitable contribution and thereby claiming a
deduction that is otherwise expressly prohibited.28z
What political tax expenditures do have in common with traditional tax
expenditures is the shifting of a specific cost to taxpayers. Such cost
shifting can be economically regressive and can violate the tax fairness
norms of horizontal and vertical equity. It is reasonable to assume that
small contributions by ordinary citizens are less likely to be made through
conduits than are very large contributions. Horizontal equity means that
similarly situated taxpayers are treated similarly. Vertical equity means
that those with more income pay more tax. These fairness norms have
been central to the debate over tax expenditures.283 There should be no
less attention to the distributional consequences of the captive taxpayer
problem.
Political tax expenditures should be controversial because of their
implications for tax equity. If other government programs are subject to
public debate on this score,8 4 the tax subsidy arising from recharacterizing
political contributions as charitable contributions should be made part of
the debate.
280. See Kenneth Arrow, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Further Comment, 3
AM. ECON. REV. 537, 537-38 (1968) (supporting the inference that this is a classic moral
hazard problem).
281. For articles discussing the foundational analyses of tax expenditures, see Stanley
S. Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace
Tax Expenditures with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 HARV. L. REV. 352 (1970);
Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REV. 705 (1970).
282. See supra Part IH, Part IV.B.3.
283. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Assessing the Distributional Effects of Income
Ta Revision: Some Lessons from Incidence Analysis, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1975).
284. See, e.g., id. (illustrating that the current debate over tax subsidies to
corporations, often termed corporate welfare, defines the context for including a debate
over permitting deductions for political contributions recharacterized as charitable
contributions).
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D. Effect on Exempt Organizations
Exempt organizations should have a keen interest in the role played in
electoral politics by corporate-candidate conduits. In addition to the risk
of political cynicism, the increasingly visible role of corporate-candidate
conduits risks fueling cynicism about exempt organizations in general. At
a time when many are calling upon exempt organizations to address issues
previously addressed by government, such cynicism threatens to undermine
the ability of exempt organizations to fulfil their historic mission.
Exempt organizations have built a reputation for serving the public
interest directly and openly. While exempt organizations may well take
controversial positions in defense of the environment or in defense of
business interests, they have historically done so openly. Consequently,
those persons who wish to support their work could do so and those who
did not could refuse to do so. Exempt organizations maximized choice by
focusing on a clear goal, whether funding research into a particular disease
or protecting children or animals or the homeless or funding a ballet
troupe or a symphony. The specificity of organizational mission permitted
contributors to tailor their support consistent with their own preferences.
Political preferences may track with some activities of exempt
organizations but not with others. It is not at all clear that the supporters
of the Cleveland Symphony share political views, much less a preference
for any one political candidate in any electoral contest. While members
of the Sierra Club may tend to support Democrats, it is far from clear that
positions on the environment define the voting choice of all or even most
of the Sierra Club's members.
To the extent that particular exempt organizations take positions on
particular electoral contests, they may gain the advantage of intensifying
the support of some members and even of attracting some new members,
but they also risk alienating current and potential members and supporters.
For exempt organizations with their own agendas of exempt activity, these
risks should be taken seriously.285
There is no comparable risk for pure conduits, however, because they
do not have an agenda of exempt activities apart from the political agendas
of their sponsors and creators. Such organizations are routinely abandoned
once they have served their intended purpose in a particular election cycle.
Such burned-out charities are the equivalent of the burned-out tax shelters
of the 1970s. A conduit has no need to appeal to broad support and,
indeed, would find such support potentially intrusive. Similarly, a conduit
is unconcerned about the loss of its exempt status because it has no further
use of that status.
285. See supra Part I.C for a discussion of the captive member problem.
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Exempt organizations with active programs of exempt activities have
an interest in preventing organizations from trafficking in exempt status.
In effect, corporate-candidate conduits are free-riders on the public
respect, support, and trust of exempt organizations in general. To the
extent that the exempt sector sits passively by as that goodwill is
undermined by the actions of the free-riders they are complicit in creating
the undesirable consequences that may well follow.
VI. CONDUITS AND APPROACHES TO
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
Current discussions of campaign finance reform turn on two types of
proposals-regulation and disclosure. Neither of these approaches can
succeed if it does not address the role of conduits.
Regulatory proposals represent efforts to strengthen the current FECA.
They limit the amount of contributions, the identity of contributors, and
permissible uses of political contributions. In the case of presidential
candidates who receive federal matching funds, there are also limitations
on campaign expenditures. The soft money and independent expenditures
in the 1996 election have led to renewed calls for reform and the
development of new proposals for doing so.
28 6
Opponents of the regulatory approach argue either that it is
unworkable or unconstitutional or both. 287 They propose instead to
eliminate the current regulatory provisions of the FECA and to replace
them with disclosure. The nature of the proposed disclosure has not been
specified.
The kind of disclosure which might enable citizen-voters to monitor
campaign finance would necessarily be intrusive. It would involve the
kind of government role that its proponents generally condemn. The
problem is that electoral decisions are made at one set time, on election
day, and therefore disclosure must be made before election day if it is to
serve its intended purpose. Campaign finance disclosure thus operates in
a very different context than does disclosure in securities markets.
Trading decisions are made daily, or hourly, and can be undone, albeit at
some cost. Citizens cannot recast their votes the day after election day.
The difference in the timing and nature of decisions means that securities
market analogies are not useful in analyzing electoral system disclosure.
286. The McCain-Feingold Bill is currently the most prominent regulatory proposal.
It includes strong disclosure provisions. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REc. S6761, S6762-63
(daily ed. June 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. McConnell); 143 CONG. REc. S2221, S2253
(daily ed. Mar. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. McConnell).
287. Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) is the most outspoken proponent of this
approach. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REc. at S6762-63; 143 CONG. REc. at S2253.
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Conduits defeat disclosure in the absence of regulation and defeat
regulation in the absence of disclosure. Because exempt conduits both
mask the identity of the true contributor and recharacterize the activity
itself, they present a direct challenge to the integrity of the electoral
system and thus to the foundational idea that, in our representative
democracy, citizens are sovereign.
